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INTRODUCTION 
City of Heroes, an online superhero video game, allows its 
users to create their own characters, including many that infringe 
copyrights.1  The game, created by NCsoft and Cryptic Studios, 
has been in use for about two years2 and has earned tens of 
 
 1 See infra Part I.C. 
 2 See Quentin Hardy, Ordinary Hero, FORBES, Oct. 4, 2004, at 100, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2004/1004/100_print.html.  The game was launched in 
April 2004 and it is March 2006 as of this writing. See id. 
PAYNE 5/18/2006  11:36 AM 
942 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:939 
millions of dollars.3  Marvel, the owner of many of the infringed 
characters, has licensed them for exclusive use in authorized video 
games and other media for over two decades,4 and has earned 
billions of dollars.5  Marvel sued the game-makers for both direct 
and secondary infringement.6 
This case ultimately would have addressed the question left 
unanswered by the limited Grokster holding—absent inducement, 
“under what circumstances [is] the distributor of a product capable 
of both lawful and unlawful use . . . liable for acts of copyright 
infringement by third parties using the product[?]”7  As of 
December 14, 2005, the parties in Marvel v. NCsoft have settled 
their dispute, leaving this billion-dollar question of secondary 
liability unresolved for future Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).8  
This Note offers a resolution to the problem of character 
infringement in online video games with the BIFF Factors,9 the 
String Solution10 and the 7% Solution11 that will apply wherever a 
technology enables its users to infringe copyright. 
 
 3 See id. (noting that as of October 2004 “City of Heroes . . . has 180,000 users, adding 
6,000 more newcomers every week.  They pay $50 up front and $15 a month” for a total 
of $9 million in upfront fees and $2.7 million more per month).  NCsoft revenues 
attributed to City of Heroes were approximately $6.1 million for the quarter ending 
September 30, 2005. See Press Release, NCsoft, NCsoft Announces Third Quarter 
Financial Results, (Nov. 5 2005), available at http://www.ncsoft.com/eng/ 
NCPress/View.asp?hSeq=1) (announcing that City of Heroes brought in revenues of 
6.4 billion in Korean Won (KRW), which, with a ratio of 1 United States dollar (USD) to 
1,043 KRW, is $6.1 million USD). 
 4 See Chad Mullikin, The History of Marvel Video Games, XBOX ADVANCED, Sept. 19, 
2005, http://xbox.advancedmn.com/article.php?artid=5792. 
 5 See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 6 Complaint, Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCsoft Corp., Case No. CV 04-9253-RGK 
(PLAx) 9–16 (C.D. Ca. Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Marvel Complaint]. 
 7 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005). 
 8 Press Release, NCsoft, Marvel Entertainment, Inc., NCsoft Corporation, NC 
Interactive, Inc., Cryptic Studios, Inc. Settle All Litigation, (Dec. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.plaync.com/about/2005/12/marvel_entertai.html; Matt Brady, Marvel Settles 
With NCsoft/Cryptic Studios, NEWSARAMA.COM, http://www.newsarama.com/ 
forums/showthread.php?s=d8c3b41999a4c0193955aa5e93de62c3&threadid=52452 (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2005). 
 9 See infra Part VII.C. 
 10 See infra Part VI.B. 
 11 See infra Part VI.C. 
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It is important that the courts find a balance between the 
fostering of new technologies and the protection of intellectual 
property.12  Our legal system must address digital encroachments 
that threaten to overwhelm the ability of intellectual property 
companies to protect their billion-dollar investments.  It must also 
prevent important new technological developments from being 
trampled in a rush to protect copyright owners.  Without firm and 
clear guidance from the courts in cases like Marvel v. NCsoft, we 
will see an irreversible erosion of not only the business models of 
America’s character companies, but our country’s ability to protect 
our most valuable export: culture. 
This Note proposes the implementation of a clear and effective 
solution that acknowledges the responsibility of ISPs like NCsoft 
and Cryptic to prevent or reduce infringing uses of their products.  
Marvel’s claims depend on an understanding of when one 
superhero infringes another, a matter discussed later in this Note.13  
The “capable of substantial noninfringing use[]” standard for 
triggering safe harbor for non-induced third party infringements 
articulated in Sony14 needs to be revisited in light of the digital 
revolution and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
(“DMCA”),15 and rearticulated or entirely reconstructed to provide 
more practical guidance for companies at odds with each other 
over the protection of intellectual property rights. 
This Note will explore claims of copyright and trademark 
infringement that arise when an internet company’s users pay to 
create and play with characters that infringe on another character-
based company’s intellectual property rights.  The issues that were 
present in Marvel v. NCsoft provide ample opportunity to explore 
problems that have persisted as digital technology has threatened 
intellectual property interests—this Note offers a solution. 
This note proposes that courts should solve problems in online 
infringement through the congressionally considered mechanisms 
of the DMCA, and use its injunctive relief liberally to craft 
 
 12 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775. 
 13 See infra Part V. 
 14 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 789 (1984). 
 15 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
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solutions as they arise.  Over twenty years ago, a case involving 
the awesome, futuristic video-cassette recorder (“VCR”) resulted 
in safe harbor for enabling technologies16 from contributory and 
vicarious infringement claims where the product is “capable of 
substantial noninfringing use[].”17  Following this 5-4 decision,18 
paradoxically, the VCR and video rental industries became a boon 
for the copyright owners who brought and lost the case.19  
However, this ham-fisted standard does not effectively protect the 
interests of intellectual property companies like Marvel in the 
digital age.20  Because of the ways in which new technologies 
emerge, the most efficient solution to a digital infringement 
problem will place liability on the party most equipped to prevent 
the violation: the technology company.21  Congress laid out a 
principled set of guidelines for dealing with these problems with 
 
 16 This Note uses “enablers” and “enabling technologies” to refer to companies and 
products that facilitate users’ creation or consumption of intellectual property, thus 
implicating copyright and trademark infringement by their users.  The use of these terms 
is in no way meant to suggest the presence of inducement, but merely the known 
capabilities of the product.  Although this Note largely discusses digital enablers, there 
have been many enablers that came into existence prior to the emergence of digital 
technology, such as Xerox, photography, cassette recorders and player pianos. 
 17 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 789. 
 18 See id. at 777, 796. 
 19 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).  As Judge 
Posner noted, “[a]n enormous new market thus opened for the movie industry[.]” Id.  In 
one notable example, Disney was reluctant to release their animated classics on video, 
fearing decreased overall revenue because of the impact they felt home videos could have 
on the septennial theatrical re-releases.  CEO Michael Eisner predicted in 1984 that the 
value of the entire Disney library in home video and cable TV markets was $200 million.  
In 1988, the then-present value of four theatrical re-releases of Cinderella over 28 years 
was estimated at $25 million.  Disney’s revenue from the Cinderella home video release 
came in at $180 million in its first year alone, and home video sales of their film library 
rapidly became Disney’s second biggest profit center. See JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEY 
WAR 64, 91–93 (Simon & Schuster 2005). 
 20 Marvel’s intellectual property interests are not insubstantial.  “By the late 1970’s, the 
licensing of Marvel characters for merchandise had become a principal line of Marvel’s 
business, . . . Spider-Man: The Movie, which was released in May, 2002, [earned] $800 
million in worldwide box-office gross, . . . [yielding] more than $50,000,000 to 
Marvel. . . . Marvel’s toy division alone reported over $100 million in sales of Spider-
Man: The Movie toys.” Lee v. Marvel Enters., Inc, 386 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  
DC Comics licensing of Superman “generated several billion dollars worth of income” 
from 1969 to 1984. DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 
110, 113 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 
 21 See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646. 
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the DMCA,22 but its intended benefits will be frustrated and 
delayed if those laws are interpreted narrowly.  Congress must not 
be expected to pass new legislation for each new twist on 
infringing uses due to advances in technology.  The courts are 
much better prepared to craft solutions that deal with the problems 
at hand and set out fact-specific solutions, so that resolutions can 
be achieved despite the changing terrain of technological advances.  
Only if the courts run too far afield of Congress’ wishes should 
new legislation guide the determination of liability for third-party 
infringements online.  Until then, courts should endeavor to solve 
the problems that come before them using the tools Congress has 
provided, rather than search for reasons to dodge the task of 
crafting a solution. 
The courts should set out clear guidelines for interpreting the 
standards of the DMCA in facilitating copyright infringement 
remedies and replace the unclear and outmoded Sony rule, which 
looks to whether the product is “capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.”23  Copyright holders and infringement 
enablers need to know their rights and responsibilities more clearly 
than they do today.  Marvel v. NCsoft provided an opportunity for 
the courts to clarify these uncertainties and to present strong 
guidance that would keep many similar infringement cases out of 
the courts and solved instead by the self-regulating aspects of the 
DMCA.  In the wake of the settlement, an exploration of the issues 
presented by the case will clarify the pressures emerging with the 
evolving nature of ISPs, demonstrate the need to alleviate the 
uncertainties that still exist post-Grokster, and provide guidance 
for the inevitable case that will pit an intellectual property owner 
against an ISP that enables infringement. 
I. HOW DID WE GET TO GROKSTER? 
Grokster is only one of the latest cases attempting to balance 
the interests of creators protecting their works and the 
constitutionally mandated public interest in the advancement of 
 
 22 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000); see also infra Part IV. for further discussion. 
 23 Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 789. 
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technology.24  “The more artistic protection is favored, the more 
technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration 
of copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off.”25  In 
order to understand what should follow Grokster, it is helpful to 
take a look into what came before. 
A. A Dash of Copyright History 
Intellectual property was first protected in the West by the 
Statute of Anne in 1710.26  Printers were worried that they would 
not be able to protect their investments in printing without some 
kind of monopoly on the material they published.27  To address this 
concern, the British government stepped in and granted writers a 
monopoly on their works, as long as they complied with certain 
procedures.28  This prevented others from using that same work to 
make money, unless they were willing to work out a deal with the 
copyright holder.  The Copyright Act of 1790 followed these 
principles and first federalized copyright protection in the United 
States, granting authors the sole right to control the use of their 
works.29  The Act was given a major revision in 1909, in response 
to authors’ inability to adequately protect their rights under the old 
regime.30  The modern copyright regime was introduced with the 
next major revision, the Copyright Act of 1976, in which the U.S. 
 
 24 Id. at 782 (noting that “[f]rom its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in 
response to significant changes in technology”). “The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries[.]” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 25 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (2005). 
 26 8 Anne c.19 (1710), reprinted in 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT app. 7 § A (Matthew Bender 2005) (1963). 
 27 See CRAIG JOYCE, ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 15–16 (5th ed. 2001). 
 28 8 Anne c. 19 § 1 (1710), reprinted in 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 7 § A (Matthew Bender 2005) (1963); JOYCE ET AL., supra 
note 26, at 16. 
 29 See Gregory S. Schienke, The Spawn of Learned Hand—A Reexamination of 
Copyright Protection and Fictional Characters: How Distinctly Delineated Must the 
Story Be Told?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 63, 65 (2005), (citing Act of May 31, 
1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, reprinted in 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT app. 7 § D (2003)). 
 30 See The Copyright Act of 1909 §§ 23–24, reprinted in 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 6 (Matthew Bender 2005) (1963). 
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made it even easier for authors to assert protection over their 
works.31  By the late 1990s, digital technology had become so 
integrated into art, that perfect copies of music and images could 
be transmitted instantly, making infringement of copyrighted 
material easier than it had ever been, and leaving the guidelines of 
the 1976 Act wanting.32  The DMCA of 1998 addressed this new 
technological reality and attempted to balance the need to protect 
intellectual property holders with the need to foster the technology 
that facilitated their transmission.33  In Marvel’s action against 
NCsoft and Cryptic, the protection Marvel sought hinged on the 
interpretation of not only this legislation, but on what exactly 
comprises contributory infringement and vicarious liability in a 
digital medium.  The question has been wrestled with in the courts 
since the enactment of the DMCA—some decisions offering strong 
protection for copyright holders, some protecting nascent 
technology.  However, the decisions only slowly chip away at 
growing insecurity between intellectual property holders and ISPs 
with regards to secondary liability. 
A few years after the DMCA was passed, rights-holders of 
music and movie properties went after companies that enabled 
users to illegally share these properties.  The Supreme Court 
addressed this case in its 2005 Grokster decision, where they posed 
the question “under what circumstances [is] the distributor of a 
product capable of both lawful and unlawful use . . . liable for acts 
of copyright infringement by third parties using the product[?]”34  
Decisions prior to the DMCA indicated that the substantiality of 
the present and potential noninfringing use would determine the 
liability based on the 1984 Sony decision, which addressed the 
VCR phenomenon.35  However, the Grokster Court unanimously 
found contributory copyright infringement because the enablers 
 
 31 See Pub. L. 94-553, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
 32 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 
(2005) (comparing the analog technology implicated in Sony with the digital technology 
of Grokster). 
 33 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 34 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770. 
 35 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 789 (1984). 
See accord, Religious Tech Center v. Netcom, 907 F.Supp 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
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had actively induced infringing behavior.36  The opinion 
specifically left open the question of the standards to determine 
secondary liability for copyright infringement, where the level of 
inducement is not equivalent to that found in the Grokster case.37  
The two concurrences offered contradictory positions on that sub-
issue, as discussed below.  Each interprets the “capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses” standard set out in Sony to support 
its finding. 
B. Breyer’s Grokster Analysis Provides Too Little Intellectual 
Property Protection 
Sony’s “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” is so loose a 
standard as to be illusory.  The Breyer concurrence in Grokster 
(joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor) shows just how 
malleable a standard it is.38  Although the goal of protecting 
nascent technologies is essential, using that goal as a decisive 
factor in rebuffing a claim of contributory infringement will almost 
always cause infringement enablers to elude responsibility for their 
actions, under Justice Breyer’s reading.  In Marvel v. NCsoft, a 
Breyer reading of Sony would mean that Marvel would have no 
right to seek any relief from NCsoft and Cryptic, absent a finding 
of inducement, and would be forced to inefficiently protect its 
properties by asserting claims against one infringing user at a 
time.39  These “John Doe lawsuits” 40 offer no meaningful 
protection at all. 
 
 36 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.  The unanimous decision in Grokster held that a 
distributor of file-sharing software is liable for its users’ copyright violations that were 
actively enabled, intended and induced through the company’s business plan and 
advertisements. Id. 
 37 See id. at 2776. 
 38 See infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 39 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2791–93. 
When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it 
may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all 
direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the 
distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of 
contributory or vicarious infringement. 
See also id. at 2776 (citing In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645–46 (7th Cir. 
2003)). 
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Justice Breyer wrote to agree with the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Sony that, absent inducement, the barest 
inclination of a potential non-infringing use would render the 
producer of an enabling technology not subject to liability for its 
users’ infringements.41  The reasoning he followed interpreted the 
Sony standard to measure “substantial noninfringing uses” at 
approximately nine percent, and that only included then-present 
uses.42  He then found Grokster to have a comparable present rate 
of ten percent noninfringing use, and a now-unforeseen, nearly 
magical future capability for noninfringing uses.43  Similarly, the 
evidence available in Marvel v. NCsoft easily passes the Sony 
standard as interpreted by Justice Breyer, that the noninfringing 
uses constitute at least ten percent of all uses.44  Most City of 
Heroes users do not play infringing characters.45  However, even a 
small percentage of infringing use can still account for a large 
number of infringing uses and substantially affect the bottom line 
of the copyright holder.  Marvel has the right to make an exclusive 
Massively Multi-Player Online Role Playing Game (“MMORPG,” 
pronounced “morg”) deal for its characters, but it cannot 
meaningfully do so if its characters are running around City of 
Heroes.46  Justice Breyer’s reading of Sony provides ample 
protection for nascent technologies, but similarly protects mature 
technologies to the unacceptable detriment of intellectual property 
holders.  Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence addresses this deficiency, 
but swings too far in the other direction. 
 
 40 See Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc v. Does 1–9, No. 04 Civ. 2289, 2004 WL 2095581 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004); Order and Attachment, Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Does 1–6, 
Civ. No. 04-1241 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/ 
RIAA_v_ThePeople/20041012_Order_Granting_Request.pdf; see also John Doe 
Lawsuits, Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa-v-
thepeople.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2005). 
 41 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2787–88 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 42 See id. at 2788–89. 
 43 See id at 2789–90. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See, e.g., City of Heroes, City of Heroes Fan Site, City of Hero Screenshots, 
http://www.saguisag.com/column/cityofheroes/ (click on individual calendar dates to see 
images of heroes created for and used in the City of Heroes game) (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2006). 
 46 See Seth Schiesel, Microsoft Joins Marvel in Online Game Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 15, 2005, at C2. 
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C. Ginsburg’s Grokster Analysis Leaves Loopholes in Intellectual 
Property Protection, and Is Not Protective Enough of 
Technology 
Looking only to present substantial non-infringing use, as the 
Ginsburg concurrence does, is also too forgiving to be a useful 
standard.  Absent inducement, the Ginsburg concurrence in 
Grokster (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy) 
would have found the company liable for contributing to the 
infringement of its users.  The “ten percent” Justice Breyer wrote 
of was interpreted by Justice Ginsburg as “little beyond anecdotal 
evidence of noninfringing uses.”47  However, the Ginsburg 
concurrence did not indicate a willingness to find liability where 
the infringing use was less than “overwhelming.”48  As articulated, 
Justice Ginsburg’s standard would not protect against 
infringements that constitute a small, or unknowable, percentage of 
the overall use of the technology, even if they occur in significant 
numbers.49  If an infringement is significant enough to merit the 
expense of pursuing a claim, rights holders should not be rebuffed 
simply because the infringement is not particularly important to the 
enabler.  As iPods merge with cell phones50 and PCs mirror TVs,51 
consolidation of technologies will make a singular percentage-use 
analysis as obsolete has having a separate knife, scissors, awl, 
corkscrew and toothpick in your hunting belt. 
Concurrently, the Ginsburg analysis does not adequately 
protect nascent technology.  Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation of 
the Sony standard determines a technology’s capable uses by 
looking no further than to its present uses.52  New technologies 
 
 47 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2785 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 48 See id. at 2786. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See, e.g., Motorola ROKR, http://direct.motorola.com/ENS/web_producthome.asp? 
Country=USA&language=ENS&productid=29790 (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). 
 51 See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Google and Yahoo Aim at Another Screen, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 6, 2006, at C1; John Markoff, Coming Soon to TV Land, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006, at 
C1; Wikipedia, Liquid Crystal Display, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LCD (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2005). 
 52 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2783–84, (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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might be based on infringement, but might also have the potential 
to be a useful and non-infringing technology, just as a writer might 
evolve a copyrighted storyline until it becomes a sufficiently 
original and non-infringing work.53  The Ginsburg analysis would 
hold a company liable in its beginning stages, before it has a 
chance to fully develop its technology into a useful and ultimately 
noninfringing purpose.54  By looking exclusively to the percentage 
of present noninfringing use, the Ginsburg standard shortsightedly 
does not provide for a company that has yet to reach a plateau of 
use before burdening it with the risk of third-party copyright 
liability.55 
To adequately protect both intellectual property rights, such as 
Marvel’s, and the development of the useful technology, like that 
employed by NCsoft and Cryptic, at the very least a more balanced 
interpretation of the Sony standard is needed than is articulated in 
any of the Grokster opinions.  A better solution is to more fully 
articulate the principles at play in Sony and the Grokster 
concurrences by establishing a new standard that incorporates all 
three and creates workable guidelines that fully address both 
technology and intellectual property concerns.  Marvel v. NCsoft 
offers a look at an important and discrete situation in which a new 
 
 53 See, e.g., Sapon v. DC Comics, 00 Civ. 8992, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5395, at *19–
20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002) (citing, e.g., Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (using the phrase “incremental addition”)). “Professor Nimmer 
recognizes . . . that ‘a defendant may legitimately avoid infringement by intentionally 
making sufficient changes in a work which would otherwise be regarded as substantially 
similar to that of the plaintiff’s,’ a proposition we recognized on the prior appeal of this 
case, and elsewhere.” Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos. 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(internal citations omitted). 
[E]vidence of intentional copying raises a presumption that a second comer 
intended to create a confusing similarity of appearance and succeeded.  But if 
comparison of the works reveals no fair jury issue concerning likelihood of 
confusion, then intent to copy, even if found from the proffered evidence, 
would not establish a Lanham Act violation. 
Id. at 246–47 (internal citations omitted) (citing B & L Sales Assocs. v. H. Daroff & 
Sons, Inc., 421 F.2d 352, 354 (2d Cir. 1970); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. 
Vacheron & Constantin-le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466-67 (2d Cir. 1955); 
Vitarroz Corp. v. River Brand Rice Mills, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 981, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)). 
 54 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2791–96 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the “chill of 
technological development”). 
 55 See id.; see also infra Part VII.C.1. 
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technology allows users to infringe on copyright to the significant 
detriment of the rights-holders, but does allow for availment of the 
protections afforded by Grokster and Sony, necessitating a new 
standard. 
II. SUPERHEROES 
In order to fully discuss the issues at play in Marvel v. NCsoft, 
it is necessary to look into the discrete milieu of superheroes—a 
form of intellectual property that has earned billions of dollars and 
has successfully adapted its specific subset of character properties 
into emerging entertainment technologies.56 
A. A Very Brief History of Superheroes 
Superheroes as we know them were first created in the 1930s.57  
Drawing inspiration from literary characters like Hercules,58 
Zorro,59 and the Scarlet Pimpernel,60 and real-life circus 
performers and daredevils,61 the first brightly-clad, crime-fighting 
superheroes were seen in the pages of comic books.62  They have 
since been featured in every milieu that could hold an image or tell 
a story: toys, clothing, food packaging, radio, television, movies, 
and more recently, video games.63 
Although “Super Hero” and “Super Villain” are part of 
common parlance, they are actually trademarked terms held jointly 
by the two biggest American comic book publishers.64  DC Comics 
 
 56 See LES DANIELS, SUPERMAN: THE COMPLETE HISTORY passim (1st paperback ed., 
Steve Korté ed., Chronicle Books 2004) (1998) [hereinafter DANIELS: SUPERMAN]. 
 57 See LES DANIELS, CHIP KIDD & GEOFF SPEAR, THE GOLDEN AGE OF DC COMICS: 365 
DAYS 4 (2004) [hereinafter DANIELS: GOLDEN AGE]. 
 58 See Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 59 See Redboots, Secret Identity: And who, disguised as Clark Kent . . . , 
http://www.redboots.net/comics/secret_identity.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2005). 
 60 See GERARD JONES, MEN OF TOMORROW: GEEKS, GANGSTERS, AND THE BIRTH OF THE 
COMIC BOOK 116 (Basic Books 2004). 
 61 See Redboots, Secret Identity: And who, disguised as Clark Kent . . . , 
http://www.redboots.net/comics/ powers_costume.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2005). 
 62 See DANIELS: SUPERMAN, supra note 56, 18–22. 
 63 See id., passim. 
 64 Word Mark SUPER HEROES, Serial No. 73222079 (1981); available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm (select “Search Trademarks” under “Get a 
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counts in its vast roster of characters Superman, Batman and 
Robin, Wonder Woman, Captain Marvel (Shazam!), Green 
Lantern, Aquaman, Plastic Man and the Flash, among many 
others.65  Marvel Comics started as Timely Comics in the 1930s, 
when it published Captain America, the Human Torch, and Sub-
Mariner comic books.66  The company changed its name and 
reinvigorated the genre in the 1960s,67 with its tragic heroes 
Spider-Man, the Fantastic Four, the Incredible Hulk, and the X-
Men as part of its developing cast of thousands of costumed 
characters.68  Both companies have published or licensed their 
superheroes to earn billions of dollars over the last seventy years,69 
and they protect their intellectual property rights in the characters 
assiduously.70 
 
Trademark Registration”; then select “New User Form Search” and enter the term “super 
heroes” into the “Search Term” box; then select the trademark with the corresponding 
serial number).  DC Comics and Marvel have co-owned these terms since 1981. See 
Brian Cronin, Comic Book Urban Legends Revealed #9!, COMICS SHOULD BE GOOD,  
July 28, 2005, http://goodcomics.blogspot.com/2005/07/comic-book-urban-legends-
revealed-9.html; see also infra Part V.F. and accompanying notes. 
 65 See SCOTT BEATTY ET AL., THE DC COMICS ENCYCLOPEDIA: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 
TO THE CHARACTERS OF THE DC UNIVERSE passim (Alastair Dougall, ed., DK Publishing, 
Inc. 2004). 
 66 Wikipedia Marvel Comics, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marvel_Comics (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2005); see RON GOULART, GREAT HISTORY OF COMIC BOOKS 145–58 
(Contemporary Books, Inc. 1986). 
 67 See Donald D. Markstein, Marvel Comics, TOONOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.toonopedia.com/marvel.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2005) (“Marvel Comics may 
have been the name of the comic (for one issue, anyway—with #2, it became Marvel 
Mystery Comics), but it wasn’t the name of the publisher.  In fact, there wasn’t any one 
name the publisher was known by for any great length of time until the 1950s, when, for 
several consecutive years, it used “Atlas” as an imprint.  It put a “Marvel Comics” logo 
on its covers for a couple of brief periods in the late ‘40s, but didn’t assume that name 
once and for all until 1963.  Among the dozens of company names it used over the years 
was “Timely.”); see also BRADFORD W. WRIGHT, COMIC BOOK NATION: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF YOUTH CULTURE IN AMERICA 212 (Johns Hopkins University Press 
2001) (discussing the impact of Marvel Comics’ comic books on the industry). 
 68 WRIGHT, supra note 67, at 204–15. 
 69 See DANIELS: SUPERMAN, supra note 56, passim.  Merchandising and licensing 
account for over 70% of Marvel’s annual income. See Second Amended Complaint, 
Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCsoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253-RGK (PLAx) 5 (C.D. Ca. Jan 25, 
2005) [hereinafter Marvel Second Amended Complaint]. 
 70 See, e.g., infra Part V.A.  They protect their rights with good reason.  For example, 
DC Comics strictly adheres to its policy of taking great care in the selection of licensees 
who will responsibly utilize and promote the Superman character, costumes, phrases, 
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B. Protecting Comic Book Characters 
Apart from the stories that detail their adventures, superheroes 
and other characters themselves are protected under both copyright 
and trademark principles.71  Unauthorized use of characters from 
one work can lead to copyright violation when used in another.72  
Common superhero phrases that started as copyrightable text have 
subsequently been trademarked, such as “up, up and away”73 and 
“faster than a speeding bullet.”74  These and other aspects of 
superheroes are protected by trademark law to the extent that they 
confuse consumers as to their source.75 
Intellectual property rights holders are threatened any time a 
new communication technology comes along—and the Internet 
was no exception.76  Fears over digital transmission through wide-
reaching and inexpensive worldwide web channels through the 
mid-1990s led to the enactment of the DMCA.77  Companies that 
operated an ISP were concerned that they could be liable for 
copyright infringement engaged in by users of their service, over 
 
names and images, and has maintained strict quality requirements, to the tune of several 
billion dollars between 1969 and 1985 alone. DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey 
Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 113 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 
 71 See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc, 720 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 
1983).  See also Jay Kogan, Trademark Protection for “Identity” Elements of Characters 
After Copyright Expires, N.Y. ST. B.A. ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L.J. 26, 26 (Fall/Winter 
2001) (explaining that “[c]haracters are entitled to protection under both copyright and 
trademark and related doctrines”). 
 72 See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 73 Word Mark FASTER THAN A SPEEDING BULLET, Serial Number 73722620 
(1989), available at http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm (select “Search 
Trademarks” under “Get a Trademark Registration”; then select “New User Form 
Search” and enter the term “faster than a speeding bullet” into the “Search Term” box; 
then select the trademark with the corresponding serial number). 
 74 Word Mark UP, UP AND AWAY, Serial Number 73176950 (1979), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm (select “Search Trademarks” under “Get a 
Trademark Registration”; then select “New User Form Search” and enter the term “up, up 
and away” into the “Search Term” box; then select the trademark with the corresponding 
serial number); see Kogan, supra note 71, at 32 (discussing the protection of “Faster 
Than A Speeding Bullet”). 
 75 See Kogan, supra note 71, at 27–28. 
 76 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 
1158 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 77 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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whom they had no meaningful supervision.78  To address this 
concern, the DMCA provides a safe harbor against a claim of 
copyright infringement if an ISP removes infringing material from 
a website when notified by the copyright holder79 (“Notice and 
Knockdown”).80 
Comic book companies regularly use Notice and Knockdown 
to combat illegal online profiting from their superhero properties,81 
but also appear to ignore certain benign uses that encourage 
fandom.82  For example, unauthorized tales of their superheroes 
called fan fiction, or “fanfic,” written by professional writers, or 
sold as if authorized by the copyright owner, are usually pursued 
by the publisher.83  Stories posted by amateurs for the pleasure of a 
small community are not generally targeted.84  The line seems to 
be drawn at moneymaking. 
C. City of Heroes Video Game: A Metropolis Without Superman 
Seeking to take advantage of the online market for superhero 
adventure, NCsoft and Cryptic Studios launched the superhero-
 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
 80 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).  This section is the notice-and-takedown provision, 
more pleasantly alliterative when referred to as “Notice and Knockdown.”  “Notice-and-
takedown” phrase is used in Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 
1002 (9th Cir. 2004); Yijun Tian, Problems of Anti-Circumvention Rules in the DMCA & 
More Heterogeneous Solutions, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 749, 779 
(Spring 2005); Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New 
Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 587, 613 (2003–2004). 
 81 See, e.g., Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, Marvel Enters., Inc. 
v. NCsoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253-RGK (PLAx) 2–3 (C.D. Ca. Jan 25, 2005) [hereinafter 
Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims]. 
 82 See Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers) about Fan Fiction, Stanford Center 
for Internet & Society, http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic/faq.cgi#QID302 (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2005).  This site talks about movies and Star Trek, not comics, but the operating 
principles are the same. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Rik Offenberger, DarkMark: The Mark Waid of Fan Fiction, THE MIGHTY 
CRUSADERS NETWORK, Apr. 19, 2005, http://www.mightycrusaders.net/darkmark.htm.  
“[T]he powers that be could stop any of us with a word.  There have been authors who 
have asked that fanfic not be written about their stuff, and we’ve complied.  On the other 
hand, if you don’t make money from it and don’t kick up too much of a fuss, the owners 
aren’t much bothered by it.” Id. 
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themed MMORPG City of Heroes in April, 2004.85  Cryptic, a 
video game development studio, developed City of Heroes with 
financial, distribution and back end support from the South Korean 
video game company NCsoft.86  Users create original superheroes 
using a character generation feature called the “Creation Engine” 
and share adventures with other players in the game’s virtual 
city.87  “Paragon City,” the eponymous city of heroes, also has a 
“tailor” among its offices, courthouses and stores, which enables 
accomplished game players to create variant or totally new 
costumes for their characters mid-game, using features similar to 
the Creation Engine.88  It was promoted as a game that “brings the 
world of comic books alive” 89 and “enables players to realize their 
comic book dreams.”90  Within a month, it had exceeded its break-
even subscriber number of 100,000.91  Cryptic also began 
publishing a print comic book series based on the game.92 
Cryptic’s intention was to create a game of superhero action 
without having to license characters from comic book publishers.93  
The City of Heroes User Agreement forbids the user of the game 
 
 85 See Hardy, supra note 2, at 100. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 1. 
 88 See Press Release, Play NC, City of Heroes Launches Issue 1: Through the Looking 
Glass, June 30, 2004, http://www.plaync.com/about/2004/06/city_of_heroes_18.html. 
(noting that “Icon, a company in the game’s fictional Paragon City, will make costume 
and body modifications.”). 
 89 See, e.g., Judd Winick, Dusting Nguyen, Richard Friend & Alex Sinclair, As the 
Crow Flies Part Two: Partners in Crime, BATMAN 627, at City of Heroes Advertisement 
(DC Comics, Jun. 2004) (on sale Apr. 2004) [hereinafter City of Heroes Advertisement]; 
Marvel Second Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 2. 
 90 Press Release, Play NC, NCsoft Launches City of Heroes Commercial Service: 
Comic Book-Based Online Game Trailblazes New Territory (Apr. 28, 2004), available at 
http://www.plaync.com/about/2004/04/ncsoft_launches_3.html [hereinafter Press 
Release: City of Heroes Launch]. 
 91 See Andrew S. Bub, City of Heroes, Issue #2 (PC), GAMESPYPC.COM, Aug. 19, 
2004, http://pc.gamespy.com/pc/city-of-heroes/540482p1.html (interview with Kevin 
Sullivan, NCsoft product marketing manager). 
 92 See Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 2; Rick 
Dakan, Brandon Mckinney & Moose Bauman, Undead in the Big City Part 1, CITY OF 
HEROES 1, at 1 (NCSoft Corporation and Cryptic Studios, Inc. Apr. 2004). 
 93 See Hardy, supra note 2 at 100; see User Agreement, City of Heroes, §§ 4(e), 6(d) 
(July 2005), available at http://www.plaync.com/help/eula_coh.html (last visited Dec. 1, 
2005) [hereinafter City of Heroes User Agreement]. 
PAYNE 5/18/2006  11:36 AM 
2006] VIDEO GAME SUPERHERO INFRINGEMENT 957 
from infringing any copyrights.94  The game also has a “Block 
List” to prevent its players from using certain potentially infringing 
or obscene character names.95 
D. Marvel Battles the Infringers 
Despite these efforts by Cryptic, users created superheroes that 
infringed on the intellectual property rights of Marvel Comics.96  
The Creation Engine was touted in reviews as the best in the 
medium, giving users the ability to create costumes and powers for 
their characters with more flexibility and particularity than any 
other game.97  Although the game had a “no infringement” policy, 
gameplayers frequently encountered characters intended to 
represent not the original creations touted by some of the game’s 
literature, but replications of licensed characters, or even real 
people.98 
 
 94 City of Heroes User Agreement , supra note 93, at § 3.  See also Ruling on Marvel’s 
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 1. 
 95 Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 1. 
 96 See Marvel Second Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 2.  For a fuller discussion 
of City of Heroes user-created infringing characters, including visual examples, visit this 
Note’s companion website at http://brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html (last visited Apr. 11, 
2006). 
 97 See, e.g., Michael Lafferty, Does Character Customization Get Any Better than City 
of Heroes?, GAMEZONE.COM, http://pc.gamezone.com/news/06_10_04_03_28PM.htm 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2005). 
 98 See Richard Duffek, City of Heroes Review, MMORPG.COM, Aug. 20, 2004, 
http://www.mmorpg.com/gamelist.cfm/setview/reviews/gameID/3/loadReview/11/page/2
/from/%2Ffeatures%2Ecfm%2Fview%2Freviews.  Although it is difficult to come by 
thorough empirical data demonstrating this reality, players often take screenshots of their 
gameplay and post them online.  It is not difficult to find evidence of characters 
infringing either the name or likeness, or both, of Marvel characters such as Hulk, Spider-
Man, Wolverine, Colossus, Tigra.  Simulations of DC Comics characters Superman, 
Batman, Wonder Woman, Shazam!, Green Lantern, and Flash abound, among many 
others.  There are infringements of property from other media, like Rayden from the 
video game Mortal Kombat, movie characters from Kill Bill and Robocop, and television 
characters like The Tick and Sydney Bristow from Alias.  Recalling one of the most 
famous cases in character copyright, a black and white character called Bogie was created 
by a user of the game.  Real people also have been created and used as characters in the 
game, including NFL stars John Elway and Brett Favre, Maxim Magazine model Mandy 
Amano, and the game-player themselves, although the right of publicity implicated is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  These examples are a testament not only to the vast 
creative powers the game grants to users, but to the disinclination of many users to create 
wholly original characters to play City of Heroes and the degree to which Cryptic allows 
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In September of 2004, Marvel first contacted Cryptic and 
NCsoft to complain that City of Heroes contained infringing 
characters.99  Marvel felt the game allowed and encouraged its 
users to infringe character rights it held in characters like the 
Incredible Hulk, Wolverine, and the Thing.100 
Apparently leading to an unsatisfactory result, the contact was 
followed with a DMCA notification in October of 2004.101  The 
notification was rebuffed by NCsoft and Cryptic as lacking 
“statements of accuracy or good faith belief.”102  In addition, 
NCsoft and Cryptic “objected that the names of [the] characters 
specified in the letter had already been added to the software’s 
Block List.”103  Nevertheless, NCsoft and Cryptic agreed to 
“review the characters and modify the Block List if needed.”104 
Still unsatisfied, on November 2, 2004, Marvel sent another 
DMCA infringement notification to NCsoft, citing the characters 
“Hulk10” and “Wolverine20” that were found in City of Heroes.105  
This time, NCsoft followed up by deleting many characters to 
ensure the infringing characters were removed.106  These efforts to 
solve the problem without involving the courts were unsuccessful.  
Judging from the mere eight days before Marvel’s next action, they 
were perhaps unsuccessful by design. 
 
infringement as a commonplace aspect of the game.  For a collection of images culled 
from City of Heroes fan websites posting these infringing images and more, visit this 
Note’s companion website at http://brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html (last visited Apr. 11, 
2006).  For a sense of the long-term flow of the game, without actually having to play, 
visit Christopher Sauisag’s illuminating 18 month screenshot diary of City of Heroes 
gameplay, at City of Heroes, City of Heroes Fan Site, City of Hero Screenshots, 
http://www.saguisag.com/column/cityofheroes/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter 
Sauisag City of Heroes Diary]. 
 99 Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 2. 
 100 Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCsoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8448, 
at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Ruling on NCsoft and Cryptic’s Motions to 
Strike and Dismiss]. 
 101 See Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 2. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See id. 
 106 Id. 
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III. MARVEL SUES NCSOFT AND CRYPTIC ON INFRINGEMENT 
THEORIES 
On November 10, 2004, Marvel filed suit against NCsoft and 
Cryptic Studios for infringement in the Central District of 
California.107  Marvel claimed that the game unlawfully permitted 
and induced infringement of Marvel’s copyrights and 
trademarks.108  As it stood at the time of the December 14, 2005 
settlement after more than a year of motion practice, Marvel had 
five surviving complaints.109  The first claim, direct copyright 
infringement, was based on copyrighted Marvel characters.110  
Marvel not only claimed that the aspects of the game and its 
marketing materials created by Cryptic such as Statesman directly 
infringed,111 but that NCsoft and Cryptic were guilty of aiding the 
direct infringements of their users.112 
Marvel’s second claim, contributory copyright infringement, 
was to be judged on the A&M Records v. Napster standard,113 
which would have required that NCsoft and Cryptic had 
knowledge of the infringing conduct by their users, and that they 
induced, caused, or contributed to the infringing conduct.114  
 
 107 Marvel Complaint, supra note 6. 
 108 See id. at 2–3. 
 109 See Ruling on NCsoft and Cryptic’s Motions to Strike and Dismiss, supra note 100 
at *20. 
 110 Id. at *6. 
 111 Marvel Second Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 11. 
 112 Id. at 11–12.  This claim of direct infringement is presumably based on the theory 
that the user-generated characters are actually works jointly created by both NCsoft and 
Cryptic and the user, and wholly-owned by NCsoft and Cryptic by the terms of the User 
Agreement, see City of Heroes User Agreement, supra note 93, thus conferring direct 
liability, although this is not articulated in the complaint. 
 113 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–22 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the test involves the company’s 
“actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system, that it 
could block access to the system by suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed 
to remove the material”). 
 114 Ruling on NCsoft and Cryptic’s Motions to Strike and Dismiss, supra note 100, at *7 
(citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019).  This ruling was written a few months before Grokster 
was handed down by the Supreme Court, so as of this writing, it is unclear if the Central 
District will revise its standard to preclude the “caused, or contributed” clause based on 
that opinion in a future case.  It is clear that the Central District will follow Grokster’s 
analysis of inducement, whether it is as a prong of the claim or its entirety.  For further 
discussion, see infra Part VII.A. 
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Marvel’s third claim, vicarious copyright infringement, was 
defined in the Napster decision as well, requiring direct 
infringement by the user, direct financial benefit to NCsoft and 
Cryptic, and their ability to supervise.115  The fourth claim, 
common-law trademark infringement, suggested that the image of 
Statesman was a rip-off of Marvel’s Captain America.116  
Interpretations of these standards in an inevitable future case based 
on the unresolved issues will provide the opportunity for the Court 
to fully answer the question posed by Grokster and correct the 
limitations of Sony inquiry. 
IV. THE INFRINGEMENT-ENABLING PUZZLE 
Examination of Marvel’s surviving claims of copyright and 
trademark infringement address the larger debate about how and 
when to protect copyright in the face of rapidly advancing digital 
technology.117  A company making millions of dollars118 in a 
billion-dollar industry119 is enabling its users to infringe the 
intellectual property of a company that has exploited those rights to 
the tune of billions of dollars.120  It is important that these issues 
are resolved, as they affect all companies that commerce in 
intellectual property. 
 
 115 Ruling on NCsoft and Cryptic’s Motions to Strike and Dismiss, supra note 100, at *9 
(citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022). 
 116 Id. at *11–12. 
 117 Marvel’s claims of economic interference and the counterclaims of trademark 
infringement and false notification will be mentioned, but are not the focus of this Note. 
 118 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 119 “Video games are a $6.35 billion industry with online game revenue forecasted to 
reach $9.8 billion in 2009.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Massively 
Multiplayer Online Games and the Video Game Revolution, Aug. 3, 2005, 
http://www.globalization101.org/index.php?file=news1&id=10. 
 120 In 2004 alone, Marvel Enterprises reported $4 billion in worldwide retail sales. See 
Dawn Wilensky, Are You on the List? Most Leading Licensors Remained Flat 2004 
over 2003, LICENSE!, Apr. 2005, at 16, available at http://www.licensemag.com/ 
licensemag/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=154144. 
PAYNE 5/18/2006  11:36 AM 
2006] VIDEO GAME SUPERHERO INFRINGEMENT 961 
A. Operators of MMORPGs Appropriately Fall within the Scope 
of the DMCA 
The original inspirations for the safe harbor provision of the 
DMCA were internet companies like America Online (AOL) and 
Verizon.121  These companies were basically paving the virtual 
roads of the “information superhighway” that fueled imaginations 
and the economy through the nineties, and were concerned that 
they not become liable for the infringing uses of their millions of 
users.  Since they had little oversight of the content on web pages 
they hosted, they were able to secure a safe harbor provision.122  
Further litigation fleshed out the scope of the definition of ISP, to 
whom safe harbors are afforded—some cases limiting it to only 
those companies that provide back-end support for transferring 
information, some extending it to anyone with a web presence. 
In the Marvel v. NCsoft litigation, the Central District of 
California Western Division found that NCsoft and Cryptic qualify 
as ISPs under the DMCA.123  The court chose an inclusive reading 
of the Section 512(c) safe harbor provision, which defines an ISP 
as “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator 
of facilities therefore . . . .”124  Previous rulings from the court have 
found internet vendors eBay and Amazon to be ISPs under the 
DMCA.125  Other courts have held similarly, including the Western 
 
 121 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 122 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000); see, e.g., TECH LAW JOURNAL, BLUMENTHAL V. DRUDGE AND 
AOL, Dec. 18, 1999, http://www.techlawjournal.com/courts/drudge/Default.htm (AOL 
dismissed from a slander case against The Drudge Report).  But see Sarah Deveaux, 
Yahoo Wins Court Reprieve in Nazi Sales Case, CNN.COM, July 26, 2000, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/07/26/yahoo.nazi.idg (Yahoo subject to 
prosecution in France for allowing its users to offer Nazi memorabilia, which is illegal in 
France). 
 123 Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 5. 
 124 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2000). 
 125 See Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 915 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 
(finding that Amazon meets the DMCA’s definition of a service provider); Hendrickson 
v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that eBay qualifies as 
a service provider).  “The DMCA also provides a different, more restrictive, definition of 
‘service provider.’ See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A).  This definition only applies to entities 
seeking protection from liability under the ‘transitory digital network communications’ 
safe harbor. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).  The more restrictive definition does not apply to an 
entity, such as Amazon, that seeks protection under the ‘information residing on systems 
or networks at the direction of users’ safe harbor. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).” Corbis 
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District of Washington,126 the Seventh Circuit,127 the D.C. 
District,128 and the Fourth Circuit.129  They have found that the 
definition of an ISP should be read inclusively in order to grant 
safe harbor for cooperating internet entities.  There are other courts 
and scholars that have suggested the safe harbor provision should 
be read more narrowly.  The Eighth Circuit has noted that if 
Congress wants a more inclusive law, they should pass new 
legislation.130  Similarly less inclusive readings of the definition of 
an ISP have appeared in the D.C. Circuit131 and in North 
Carolina.132 
Because the DCMA provides sufficient tools for courts to use 
in fashioning responsible solutions for questions of digital 
infringement, it should be read to include game operators like 
 
Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 n. 5 (W.D. Wa. 2004).  “Corbis 
argues that Amazon is not a service provider because Amazon does not ‘serve to route or 
connect online digital communications.’  This argument is unavailing—the relevant 
definition of service provider does not require Amazon to engage in such activity. See 17 
U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).” Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 n. 6 (internal citations omitted). 
 126 Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (noting that the definition of an ISP under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(k)(1)(B) (2000) “encompasses a broad variety of Internet activities” and that “there 
is no doubt that Amazon fits within the definition”). 
 127 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 657–58 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (noting 
that “‘service provider’ is defined so broadly that we have trouble imagining the 
existence of an online service that would not fall under the definitions” in a case about a 
file-sharing/music downloading service).  This decision was affirmed in the Seventh 
Circuit. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
“the definition of Internet service provider is broad (‘a provider of online services or 
network access, or the operator of facilities therefor,’ 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2000)) 
and, as the district judge ruled, Aimster fits it”). 
 128 In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting the 
narrow definition of “service provider” in 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2000) and the inclusive 
broader definition of “service provider” in 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)–(d) (2000)). 
 129 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that the Act defines a service provider broadly). 
 130 In re Charter Communs., Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is the 
province of Congress, not the courts, to decide whether to rewrite the DMCA in order to 
make it fit a new and unforeseen [I]nternet architecture and accommodate fully the varied 
permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by new technology.” 
(internal quotations and citation omitted)).  It appears that the Eighth Circuit’s desire to 
get at infringers contributed materially to this finding. See id. 
 131 See Recording Industry Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 
1229, 1237–38 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 132 See In re Subpoena To University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 367 F. Supp. 2d 
945, 953 (M.D.N.C 2005). 
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NCsoft.133  The letter of the law makes it fairly clear that they 
should fall under the safe harbor provisions of Sections 512 (b) 
and (c).134  Moreover, there are more important reasons for having 
an expansive view of the scope of the DMCA.  Ease of publication 
in a digital environment ensures that copyright infringement 
situations will continue to arise.  If the DMCA is not read liberally, 
the only recourse intellectual property companies will have is to 
bring an action in court.  The DMCA provides a way to lessen that 
burden.  Given the complexity of the DMCA and the acceptance 
among circuits of an inclusive definition of an ISP, it seems 
inefficient to require Congress to revisit the issue when the result 
would likely be similar.  It is more sensible to accept the 
interpretation that would allow courts to solve the problem.  
Congress should only be expected to step in where the courts have 
clearly acted outside of the purpose of the legislation. 
However, concurrent with an inclusive reading, there should be 
a fact-intensive inquiry leading to an active use of injunctive relief 
available under Section 512(j)(1)(A)(iii).  Filtering technology is 
already considered in the DMCA,135 but courts should use the 
injunctive authority to craft the scope of the filtering necessary.  
Each new use of the technology threatens an imbalance.  Where 
traditional market forces and economic incentives fail to solve 
problems, courts must have a free hand in crafting solutions within 
the power granted by Congress in the DMCA.  Where a court has 
been drawn into a dispute, that court is in the best position to 
dictate the appropriate future filtering behavior required to grant a 
safe harbor.  Further discussion in this Note will consider exactly 
what that scope of injunctive relief available under the DMCA 
should be.136 
 
 133 See Charter Communs., 393 F.3d at 778 (Murphy, J. dissenting) (“The legislative 
solution in response to these concerns significantly limited the liability of ISPs for 
infringement by their customers and provided copyright holders more direct means to 
attack digital piracy.”). 
 134 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2000) (defining an ISP under §§ 512 (b) and (c) as “a 
provider of online services”). 
 135 Id. at § 512(j)(2)(D) (stating that, in granting an injunction, courts should consider 
“whether other less burdensome and comparably effective means of preventing or 
restraining access to the infringing material are available”). 
 136 See infra Part VI. 
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B. The Inducement to Infringe in City of Heroes Does Not Rise to 
the Level of a Violation under Grokster 
The Grokster case was lined up to answer the question of 
whether the Sony standard of “capable of substantial noninfringing 
use” still existed and how it applied to online infringement.  
However, the decision instead added a new layer of inquiry before 
the Sony standard needed to be addressed.137  The Court decided 
unanimously that both Grokster’s and StreamCast’s behavior 
constituted inducing infringement and that each was thus liable for 
the copyright infringements of its users.138  In order to determine if 
any acts by NCsoft or Cryptic would have triggered a Grokster 
violation, a look into the Grokster and StreamCast inducing 
behavior is appropriate. 
Grokster predicated its business model on attracting the 
infringing users abandoned by Napster after its services were 
found to confer copyright liability.139  They hoped to attract 
advertising linked to their interface by distributing their software 
freely and making it clear to its potential users that the software 
could aid them in illegally sharing copyrighted materials.140  The 
vast majority of the materials transferred using the software was 
copyrighted material and the owners of those copyrights banded 
together in the Grokster suit.141  The Court unanimously found 
liability on an inducement theory, based on many actions taken by 
Grokster and StreamCast in distributing their product.142  
StreamCast averred that their “goal [was] to get in trouble with the 
law and get sued.”143  They prepared promotional materials that 
flaunted the illegal uses of their software.144  StreamCast rebuffed 
other companies’ offers to help them monitor infringement, and 
 
 137 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 
(2005). 
 138 See id. 
 139 Id. at 2772–73. 
 140 Id. at 2773. 
 141 Id. at 2771–72; see id. at 2786 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (recounting specific 
figures which indicate that the vast majority of the materials shared were copyrighted). 
 142 See id. at 2770. 
 143 Id. at 2773. 
 144 See id. 
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blocked them from doing so independently.145  The Court also 
looked disfavorably on attempts to attract the user base of the 
“notorious” Napster service,146 who are established as “of a mind 
to infringe.”147  Grokster developed a program that would direct 
computer users searching for “Napster” on a search engine to the 
Grokster web site.148  StreamCast presented itself as “similar to 
what Napster was.”149 
NCsoft and Cryptic took several actions that Marvel 
complained are sufficiently inducing to trigger liability under the 
Grokster standard.150  The City of Heroes marketing exhorted 
potential customers to “bring[] the world of comic books alive,” 
although at the time it owned no comic book characters of its 
own.151  Marvel claimed that the Creation Engine “encourages 
players to create and utilize Heroes that are nearly identical in 
name, appearance and characteristics to characters belonging to 
Marvel” by including choices that allow power combinations 
similar to Marvel characters.152  Through its lax enforcement of the 
non-infringement clause in NCsoft and Cryptic’s user agreement, 
Marvel alleged that City of Heroes effectively creates a space 
where it is known that there will be no consequence for the 
infringement of character rights.153 
Comparisons can be made between NCsoft’s actions and the 
inducing behavior in Grokster.  The companies in each case were 
aware that their users employed their software to engage in acts of 
copyright infringement.154  Each encouraged that infringement 
 
 145 Id. at 2774. 
 146 See id. at 2772. 
 147 Id. at 2774. 
 148 Id. at 2773. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See Marvel Second Amended Complaint, supra note 69, at 2. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See id. (noting that City of Heroes allows a player to create a character “nearly 
identical in appearance and attributes as” Marvel’s characters). 
 153 See, e.g., id. at 7. 
 154 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772 (noting that “Grokster and StreamCast concede the 
infringement in most downloads and it is uncontested that they are aware that users 
employ their software primarily to download copyrighted files”); see Ruling on Marvel’s 
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 1–2 (noting that NCsoft and Cryptic 
added names to its block list and removed characters from its system that allegedly 
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through their advertising and public statements and sought out 
customers who were drawn to the protected works.155  Neither 
company made effective efforts to impede their users’ infringing 
behavior.156  Both companies’ opportunities grew as their user base 
did, which they knew depended in significant part on users who 
intended to infringe.157  And in both cases, the pursuit of direct 
infringers was prohibitively expensive for copyright holders, which 
led to underenforcement.158 
Where no action is taken to encourage infringement through 
means such as advertising, the distributor will not be subject to 
liability for contributory infringement under Grokster,159 a kind of 
“don’t ask, don’t sell” standard.160  However, Grokster and 
StreamCast had clearly induced, and could be found liable for the 
infringement of their users.161  Once Grokster-level inducement 
has been found, there is liability for user infringement.162  
However, NCsoft and Cryptic did not induce users to infringe to 
the same degree as either Grokster or StreamCast.  The main 
 
infringed Marvel’s rights) in conjunction with City of Heroes User Agreement, supra 
note 93. 
 155 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774; see Hardy, supra note 2 (noting that game co-creator 
Richard Dakan brought in Jack Emmert “to build a game featuring the science fiction of 
comic-book superheroes—without paying license fees for established characters like 
Batman or Spider-Man”); City of Heroes Advertisement, supra note 89 (NCsoft and 
Cryptic advertisement in a superhero comic book); Press Release: City of Heroes Launch, 
supra note 90 and accompanying text (“everyone can be the hero they’ve always 
dreamed of”) (together indicating that NCsoft and Cryptic wanted to create a game for 
fans of superhero comics and advertised as such). 
 156 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774; see Duffek, supra note 98 (noting that City of Heroes 
was riddled with infringing superheroes from launch through the filing of the suit). 
 157 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774; see Bub, supra note 91 and accompanying text (noting 
how NCsoft calculated its breakeven costs based on the number of subscribers it was able 
to enlist to City of Heroes). 
 158 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776; In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F. 3d 643, 645 
(7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “chasing individual consumers is time consuming and is a 
teaspoon solution to an ocean problem” (citing Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry 
Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 442 (2002))); Marvel 
Complaint, supra note 6, at 11–13 (alleging “literally thousands of infringing Heroes 
roaming the streets of [City of Heroes]”). 
 159 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists 
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 160 Jon Pareles, The Court Ruled, So Enter the Geeks, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005 at E1. 
 161 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2782. 
 162 Id. at 2770. 
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distinction is that in Grokster, the vast majority of uses of the 
software were infringing—practically the sole purpose was to 
illegally download copyrighted songs.163  In Marvel v. NCsoft, 
there is no accurate measure of the percentage of users that 
infringe and there is certainly evidence of a great deal of non-
infringing use.164  In Grokster, the non-infringing use was 
practically theoretical,165 as was an effective filtering remedy, due 
to the construction of the software.166  Where software has been 
constructed without consideration of reasonably foreseeable 
secondary infringement, it seems fair that the burden of correcting 
the problem should lie with the enabling software company.  The 
potentially inducing advertising claim that the game “brings the 
world of comic books alive”167 was an important, but ultimately 
small, portion of NCSoft’s promotional text.  Although NCsoft 
was not completely ignorant as to infringing uses of its service, the 
evidence of inducement is not as substantial as it was in Grokster, 
and is not even sufficient to trigger liability under the articulated 
Grokster standard.  Grokster was held liable by the Supreme Court 
under its articulated standard that “one who distributes a device 
with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown 
by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringements by 
third parties.”168  Although it appears to have been an object of 
NCsoft to promote the fact that users could infringe, it was not the 
object that they would, as it was in Grokster. 
C. The Intersection of Sony and Notice and Knockdown 
The question of the amount of infringement necessary to 
trigger liability for third-party infringements absent inducement 
that Grokster failed to answer169 was originally posed in the Sony 
 
 163 Id. at 2771. 
 164 See, e.g., Sauisag, City of Heroes Diary, supra note 98. 
 165 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2785 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 166 See id. at 2781 (noting that “neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or 
other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their software”). 
 167 See City of Heroes Advertisement, supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 168 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770 (emphasis added). 
 169 See id. at 2786 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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decision.170  There, television program copyright holders pursued 
their rights against VCR manufacturers who were enabling their 
users to create unauthorized copies of the copyrighted 
programming.171  The Sony Court held that the sale to the general 
public of equipment capable of substantial noninfringing uses does 
not constitute contributory infringement for users’ infringement of 
copyright.172  At the time of Sony, some sports, religious and 
educational broadcasters allowed VCR owners to tape their 
broadcasts.173  The Court found that this was enough noninfringing 
use to provide safe harbor for VCR manufacturers, and found 
separately that even if it was not, the “timeshifting” function of the 
VCR, the ordinary consumer use to tape a show and watch it later, 
constituted “fair use” and was not infringing.174  Grokster 
presented an opportunity for the Court to provide more guidance 
for determining what exactly does constitute “substantial 
noninfringing uses.” 
By basing its unanimous decision on an inducement theory, the 
Grokster Court avoided the question of whether the file-sharing 
product was sufficiently “capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses,” as the Court found a VCR to be in Sony.  Two concurring 
opinions held opposite positions on the issue.  Justice Ginsburg 
wrote that the Grokster and StreamCast products are used 
overwhelmingly to illegally copy protected works and failed the 
Sony standard.175  Justice Ginsburg also commented that their 
supposedly substantial noninfringing use was either speculative or 
“little beyond anecdotal.”176  Justice Breyer disagreed and wrote 
that the product clearly satisfied the Sony standard of nine percent 
noninfringing use, which included the sharing of authorized copies 
of music, free electronic books, public domain and authorized 
software, and authorized music videos, as well as possible future 
non-infringing uses.177  Justice Breyer also pointed out other tools 
 
 170 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 789 (1984). 
 171 Id. at 777. 
 172 Id. at 795–96. 
 173 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2788 (Breyer, J. concurring) (discussing the facts of Sony). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2785 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 2788–89 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
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for reducing piracy, like Grokster-style inducement theory suits, 
traditional direct infringement suits, new technology, and making 
lawful copying cheaper and easier.178  Each concurring opinion had 
the support of three Justices,179 with the remaining three Justices 
seeing no present need to address the issue that will likely define 
future file-sharing cases.180 
In its 1996 Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction decision, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that the operators of a swap meet could be held liable 
for vicarious and contributory infringement of copyright and 
contributory trademark infringement.181  Although not a 
technology decision, it offers a good analogy to Marvel v. NCsoft.  
In each case, a company was aware that its service was being used 
to infringe and did not fully pursue avenues available to it to 
prevent that infringement.  In neither case was the infringing 
behavior the “overwhelming” use of the service.  A finding of 
liability absent inducement in Fonovisa opens the door for a 
finding of liability in Marvel v. NCsoft.  Fonovisa is a post-Sony 
finding of vicarious and contributory liability for an enabler.  
Although it is pre-DMCA, its analysis of the claims is not 
outmoded.  The Grokster holding may have foreclosed a Fonovisa 
finding of contributory liability absent inducement, but the opinion 
specifically reserved the possibility for a finding of vicarious 
liability.182 
The Grokster Court held that “[o]ne infringes vicariously by 
profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a 
right to stop or limit it.”183  NCsoft has the right to stop or limit the 
infringement of its users by the terms of its End User License 
Agreement (“EULA”).184  Sony seems to indicate that “profiting 
from direct infringement” would be determined in the context of an 
enabling technology under its “capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses” standard.  Unfortunately, its definition is at best unclear, and 
 
 178 Id. at 2794–95 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
 179 See id. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J. concurring), 2787 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
 180 See id. at 2776 n.9. 
 181 76 F.3d 259, 264–65 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 182 Grokster, 125 S. Ct at 2776 n.9. 
 183 Id. at 2776 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 
(2d Cir. 1963)). 
 184 See City of Heroes User Agreement, supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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at worst inadequate.  The DMCA offers a safe harbor by more 
fully defining the phrase “exercise a right” for an ISP.185  
Therefore, under the Sony standard, absent inducement, an enabler 
can avoid liability for vicarious infringement by following the 
DMCA Notice and Knockdown procedures.  A fact-based analysis 
will be required to determine what the filtering procedures should 
be with regards to new applications of emerging technologies.  
This Note offers a solution in the context of character generation in 
video games below,186 and finds that NCsoft and Cryptic would be 
secondarily liable, suggesting specific injunctive relief available 
for Marvel under the terms of the DMCA.187 
D. Strictly Interpreted Notice and Knockdown Does Not Provide 
Adequately Protect Copyright Holders 
The biggest problem with Notice and Knockdown is its strict 
interpretation of notice.  As originally conceived, it works well for 
a website that posts the full text of a copyrighted novel.  An 
infringer would have to create a page in a program, such as 
Dreamweaver,188 upload the page to a website, and lure other 
people to the website.  The benefit to the infringer comes from 
drawing attention to itself, whether it results in selling the 
infringing material, or advertising to the people who come to see 
the infringing material.  The infringing website would thus come to 
the attention of the rights-holder, or through a simple web search 
of a passage from the copyrighted work, a process that can be 
programmed to run automatically.  Once the ISP received 
notification of the infringing material, the offending work would 
 
 185 See Grokster, 125 S.Ct at 2776. 
 186 See infra Part VI. 
 187 If the court did not want to find NCsoft and Cryptic liable, it could have found that 
the Sony safe harbor survives Grokster one way or another, and confer protection for City 
of Heroes as an emerging technology “capable of substantial noninfringing use.”  This 
approach is unusual and unlikely, but worthy of at least a mention.  This Note finds a far 
better solution in replacing the Sony standard with the BIFF Factors, discussed infra 
Part VI. 
 188 SiteBuilder.ws, Dreamweaver Video Tutorials, http://www.sitebuilder.ws/ 
dreamweaver/tutorials/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).  Dreamweaver is an “industry-leading 
development tool enabling users to efficiently design, develop and maintain standards-
based websites and applications.” Macromedia.com, Dreamweaver 8, 
http://www.macromedia.com/software/Dreamweaver (last visited Mar. 29, 2006). 
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be removed, the infringer would be on notice, and the ISP would 
not be burdened with policing its sites.  Repeat offenders would be 
discouraged because each knockdown would require the offender 
to repeatedly invest start-up costs to attract users and would require 
a cumbersome turnaround time for reposting. 
However, in the context of a game like this, the “posting” of 
infringing material is much more fluid.  The ISP itself enables the 
creation of the material and its posting through the Creation Engine 
and the maintenance of the game.  When Cryptic is notified of an 
infringing character, the character is knocked down, but the 
infringing user can simply try again with the same tools provided 
by the game. 
In addition, a copyright holder cannot generally discover a 
player who has infringed its rights without playing the game.  Once 
the game has been joined, it runs on several different servers 
(named Justice, Liberty, etc.), similar to NFL games between 
different teams played simultaneously in different stadiums in 
different cities.189  For a company like Marvel to police the game, 
they would need a presence in all of the servers at all times, which 
is just the kind of monitoring the DMCA discourages in enforcing 
its provisions.190 
V. INFRINGEMENT IN THE MILIEU OF SUPERHEROES 
For a finding of copyright infringement, whether direct, 
contributory or vicarious, there must be an instance of the copying 
of protected materials.  All of Marvel’s characters at issue are 
protected by copyright.  Since these characters are all superheroes, 
certain discrete issues are raised that have been explored in prior 
cases.  The scope of copyright protection for superheroes will 
inform the scope of the solution necessary in a character 
infringement case like Marvel v. NCsoft. 
 
 189 See NFL.com, NFL Schedules, http://www.nfl.com/schedules (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2005). 
 190 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2000) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
[require] a service provider monitoring its service . . .”).  A more helpful interpretation of 
the notice aspect of Notice and Knockdown is discussed below. See infra Part VI.A and 
accompanying notes. 
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A. Superhero Infringement Cases 
1. 1941: Wonderman: Closely Imitating the Costume 
There have been several cases involving the infringement of 
superheroes since Superman hit the scene in 1938.191  The first was 
inspired by Superman himself.192  Superman debuted in an 
anthology magazine called Action Comics, published by Detective 
Comics, Inc., the precursor to DC Comics.193  It sold surprisingly 
well from the beginning, but the publisher was not sure which 
feature was driving the sales.  However, Detective Comics’ 
accountant Victor Fox had figured out that it was the popularity of 
the colorfully unique Superman, and left the publishing company 
to start his own Bruns Publications.194  He hired his own artists and 
writers, and put out the first issue of Wonder Comics in May of 
1939, featuring Wonderman.195  Detective Comics sued him for 
infringing Superman.196  The court found that Bruns Publications 
had infringed, citing the copying of panels from the original, and 
the copying of story elements.197  Traditional copyright law covers 
the copying of story elements, and was applied here.198  The 
question of additional protection for the character apart from the 
story was specifically acknowledged as prohibited by Nichols v. 
 
 191 See DANIELS: GOLDEN AGE, supra note 57, at 4 (noting that Superman debuted in 
Action Comics in 1938). 
 192 See Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir.1940). 
 193 See Jerome Siegel & Joe Shuster, Superman, ACTION COMICS 1, at inside cover, 1 
(Detective Comics, Inc. June 1938) (first appearance of Superman), reprinted in 
SUPERMAN IN ACTION COMICS ARCHIVES, VOLUME ONE 9 (Bob Kahan ed., DC Comics 
1997), available at http://superman.ws/tales2/action1/?page=0 (last visited Dec. 3, 2005) 
(providing image of inside cover); see also Siegel v. Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 
F.2d 909, 911 (2d Cir. 1974).  For the full story of Superman’s journey from creation to 
publication, see DANIELS: SUPERMAN, supra note 56, at 15–35. 
 194 See Schienke, supra note 29, at 69. 
 195 See id.; Will Eisner, The Origin of Wonder Man, WONDER COMICS 1, at 1 (Fox 
Publ’ns May 1939).  Fox hired comics legend Will Eisner to create the first issue, under 
orders to create “another Superman.”  Eisner subsequently testified against Fox in the 
trial. Mikel Midnight, Wonder Man, WILDWOOD CEMETERY: THE SPIRIT DATABASE, 
http://www.wildwoodcemetery.com/wonderman.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2005). 
 196 See Bruns, 111 F.2d at 433. 
 197 See id.  For a side-by-side comparison of the offending panels, visit this Note’s 
companion website at http://brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 198 See Bruns, 111 F.2d at 433. 
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Universal Pictures,199 but was effectively addressed in the 
injunctive relief.200  Where an infringer is not copying any story 
elements, specific feats or particular images, the relevant standard 
articulated in Bruns is an injunction prohibiting “closely imitating 
[a superhero’s] costume or appearance in any feat whatever.”201  
Since the milieu of superheroes—whether in a comic book or in a 
video game—will inherently involve “feats,” infringement can be 
established through the similarity of costume or appearance.202 
2. 1942: The Lynx with Blackie the Mystery Boy: 
A Comparison of the Cartoons 
Unbowed by his loss in the Wonderman case,203 Fox tried 
again in August of 1940 with a feature in his Mystery Man Comics 
featuring The Lynx, an athletic crime-fighter with a boy sidekick 
called Blackie the Mystery Boy.204  The judge came to the same 
conclusion as in the Wonderman case, finding “deliberate copying 
by the defendant of drawings and cartoons of the Batman and his 
companion Robin.”205  The costumes of the Lynx and Blackie do 
not look anything like Batman and Robin at first glance, but 
considering that the work was copied panel by panel in some 
instances, the resemblance of linework that led to the finding of 
 
 199 Id. at 434 (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)). 
 200 See id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1802 
(3d ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1996) (“Superhero: A figure, especially in a comic strip or 
cartoon, endowed with superhuman powers and usually portrayed as fighting evil or 
crime.”). 
 203 See supra Part V.A.1. 
 204 See Detective Comics, Inc. v. Fox Publ’ns, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 872, 873  
(S.D.N.Y. 1942); Norton Kingsley, The Coming of the Lynx, MYSTERY MEN COMICS 13 
at 54 (Fox Publ’ns Aug. 1940).  This issue has not been reprinted, and an original print is 
not readily available, selling for thousands of dollars. See, e.g., William Hughes  
Vintage Collectibles.net, http://www.vintagecollectables.net/detail.php?issue_id=889& 
PHPSESSID=4a38428f03690da4565a198e7f09bb31 (last visited Dec. 3, 2005).  To see 
an adventure of The Lynx from a subsequent issue, see Norton Kingsley, The Rook 
Strikes, MYSTERY MEN COMICS 21, at 37 (Fox Publ’ns Apr. 1941), reprinted in Pure 
Excitement Comics (Vol. 1) 42, (Bill Nolan ed., Feb. 2002), available at 
http://pecomics.tripod.com/42contents.html. 
 205 Fox, 46 F. Supp. at 873. 
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infringement is more apparent.206  In a case like this, the evidence 
of intent seemed to allow a finding of infringement despite a lower 
level of similarity among the character images. 
3. 1951: Shazam!: It Takes Scarcely More than a Glance 
Another Superman infringement case involved Fawcett 
Publishing’s Captain Marvel, a boy who could turn into a 
costumed, super-powered man by uttering the magic word 
“Shazam!”207  The case dragged on through the 1940s, finally 
resolving in the Second Circuit in 1952.208  Experts on both sides 
analyzed the various comic books.209  The district court compared 
 
 206 Compare Kingsley: The Rook Strikes, supra note 204 with, e.g., Bill Finger & Bob 
Kane, The Case of the Chemical Syndicate, DETECTIVE COMICS 27, at 2 (DC Comics May 
1939) (first appearance of Batman), reprinted in BATMAN ARCHIVES, VOLUME ONE 7 
(Dale Crain ed., DC Comics 1990).  A side-by-side comparison is available at this Note’s 
companion website, at http://brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 207 See Detective Comics, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 4 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); 
Bill Parker, C. C. Beck & Pete Costanza, Introducing Captain Marvel, WHIZ COMICS 2, 
at 1 (Fawcett Publ’ns Feb. 1940) (first appearance of Captain Marvel), reprinted in THE 
SHAZAM! ARCHIVES, VOLUME ONE 19 (Bob Kahan ed., DC Comics 1992). In subsequent 
years, the character would be entirely abandoned, see Brian Cronin, Comic Book Urban 
Legends Revealed #6!, COMICS SHOULD BE GOOD, July 7, 2005, http://goodcomics. 
blogspot.com/2005/07/comic-book-urban-legends-revealed-6.html, and “Marvel” was 
adopted by Timely Comics as its new name. See Markstein, supra, note 67 and 
accompanying text.  When DC Comics leased the rights to publish Fawcett’s Captain 
Marvel character from then-owner Charlton, Marvel Comics immediately produced its 
own Captain Marvel comic book starring a new space-based superhero of the same name, 
see Stan Lee, Roy Thomas & Gene Colan, Out of the Holocaust . . . A Hero!, CAPTAIN 
MARVEL 1, at 1 (Marvel Comics Group, May 1968), reprinted in Stan Lee, et al., 
MARVEL MASTERWORKS: CAPTAIN MARVEL (VOL. 1) (Marvel Comics 2005), to protect its 
trademark.  By subsequent agreement with Marvel, DC Comics can publish the 
adventures of Captain Marvel, but cannot use the term “Captain Marvel” on its covers or 
promotional materials.  Thus, the DC Comics version is typically identified as “Shazam!” 
See Brian Cronin, Comic Book Urban Legends Revealed #12!, COMICS SHOULD BE GOOD, 
Aug. 18, 2005, http://goodcomics.blogspot.com/2005/08/comic-book-urban-legends-
revealed-12.html. 
 208 See Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952) 
(memorandum to original opinion Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 
191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 209 See Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. 93 F. Supp. 349, 355–56 
(S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff’d Fawcett, 198 F.2d 927.  Compare, e.g., Siegel, supra note 193, 
at 1 (first appearance of Superman), with, e.g., Parker, supra note 207, at 1 (first 
appearance of Captain Marvel).  For a comparison of similar covers featuring the two 
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“facial appearances, costumes, etc., and the superhuman feats 
performed,” although notably, the duplication of powers in the 
abstract was not considered.210  Comparison of the characters 
included analysis of physical attributes, costumes, recounted feats, 
setting, dialogue, and story elements.211  There was also discussion 
of the intent of the creators to infringe, citing interviews with 
artists instructed to “imitate the ‘Superman’ strips and the dialogue 
and script as closely as possible.”212 
In Judge Learned Hand’s appellate opinion, he accepted the 
findings of infringement of the district court and primarily detailed 
the arcane copyright notifications required under the now-defunct 
1909 Copyright Act.213  On the issue of the standard of 
infringement for “these silly pictures,”214 Judge Hand stated that “a 
plagiarist can never excuse his wrong by showing how much he 
did not plagiarize.”215  He concluded that as to the infringement of 
Superman, final judgment required “scarcely more than a glance at 
 
characters, visit this Note’s accompanying website at http://brittonpayne.com/ 
Marvel.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 210 See Fawcett, 93 F. Supp. at 355–56. 
 211 See id.  On appeal, the Second Circuit found that “changes of a few lines or colors in 
a pictorial [work] may be too trivial to be noticeable by an ordinarily attentive reader or 
observer; and we will assume arguendo that in such cases the variant cannot be 
copyrighted.” Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 600 
(2d Cir. 1951). 
 212 Id. 
In the beginning everyone was jumping onto the comic book bandwagon.  
There was no question that Captain Marvel derived from Superman . . . We had 
our Superman-type character just like everyone else had theirs.  So why did 
Superman’s publisher pick on us? Simply because we were beating them in 
sales!  The lawsuits dragged on for years; there were three of them: We won 
the first, lost the second, won the third . . . but then there was a problem.  One 
artist, I don’t know who, took either a page or a panel from Superman comics 
and traced it exactly . . . and simply inserted Marvel where Superman was.  
That killed us.  We settled out of court.  We paid them $400,000.  The 
settlement said that we do not admit to copying Superman but promised never 
to publish Captain Marvel ever again. 
P.C. HAMERLINCK, FAWCETT COMPANION: THE BEST OF FCA 12–13 (Paul Hamerlinck ed., 
TwoMorrows Publishing 2001) (quoting Fawcett circulation director Roscoe Kent 
Fawcett in “The Fawcetts Could Do It As Well, Or Better, Than Anybody:” The Roscoe 
K. Fawcett Interview). 
 213 See Fawcett, 191 F.2d 594. 
 214 Id. at 603. 
 215 Id. 
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corresponding ‘strips’ of ‘Superman’ and ‘Captain Marvel’ to 
assure the observer that the plagiarism was deliberate and 
unabashed.”216 
In all three of these early superhero cases, infringement was 
found with considerably less similarity in appearance than in the 
City of Heroes case.  However, a great deal more emphasis was put 
on similarity of the story elements.  The decisions both clearly 
articulated that similarity in appearance would constitute 
infringement and that further examination into intent was 
appropriate. 
4. 1980: Manta and Superstretch: Trademark Protection for 
Superhero Ingredients 
Trademark law was implicated in the superhero infringement 
case of DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Associates.217  Filmation 
produced an animated series for DC Comics featuring its character 
Aquaman and had an option to produce a series for Plastic Man.218  
When the deal fell through, Filmation created adventures featuring 
Manta and Superstretch, characters similar to DC Comics’ 
properties, but entirely different in costume.219  DC Comics sued 
for trademark infringement, as well as other theories of liability.220  
The jury found that there was infringement, and the Southern 
District of New York declined to vacate their judgment.221  In its 
analysis, it noted: 
Protectable “ingredients” recognized in this circuit 
include the names and nicknames of entertainment 
characters, as well as their physical appearances and 
costumes, but not their physical abilities or personality 
traits.  The failure of any court so far to grant Lanham Act 
 
 216 Id. at 597. 
 217 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 218 Id. at 1276. 
 219 Id.  In addition to having very different costumes, Plastic Man is Caucasian and 
Superstretch is African-American. See Blacksuperhero.com, The Museum of Black 
Superheroes—Superstretch, http://www.blacksuperhero.com/exhibithtml/detail.cfm?id 
=286 (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). 
 220 Filmation, 486 F. Supp. at 1276. 
 221 See id. at 1276, 1285. 
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protection for character traits or abilities makes sense since 
it is difficult to see how such intangible qualities, having an 
infinite number of possible visible and audible 
manifestations, can achieve that fixture or consistency of 
representation that would seem necessary to constitute a 
symbol in the public mind.222 
The court noted that although DC Comics’ “remedy more 
properly lies under the Copyright Act[,] . . . an ingredient of the 
product itself can amount to a trademark protectable under § 43(a) 
because the ingredient can come to symbolize the plaintiff or its 
product in the public mind.”223  Little of the remainder of the 
decision focused on elements of superhero infringement, but 
accepted the jury’s conclusion that Manta infringed Aquaman and 
Superstretch infringed Plastic Man.224 
These cases explore elements that can lead to a finding of 
substantial similarity in a superhero case.  Superheroes are set 
apart from other fictional characters as a subgenre, primarily 
because of their costumes, but in the four cases discussed above, 
none of the infringing characters had costumes similar to the 
characters they were found to infringe.225  Nevertheless, other bad 
behavior led to a finding of character infringement.  In the 
Wonderman case, Judge Augustus Hand found that there had been 
copying of specific plot elements and panels.226  The Lynx court 
also found copying of panels,227 as did the Shazam! court.228  The 
court in the Manta and Superstretch case upheld the lower court’s 
finding of infringement, but largely presented the case as a contract 
termination gone bad.229  Because MMORPGs like City of Heroes 
 
 222 Id. at 1277 (emphasis added). 
 223 Id. 
 224 See id. at 1276, 1279. 
 225 Some early cases looked at brightly colored tights and a cape as infringing, but a 
casual glance at the hero pairs would not in itself lead to a finding of substantial 
similarity.  For a side-by-side comparison of the characters, visit this Note’s companion 
website at http://brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 226 See Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc, 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 227 See Detective Comics, Inc. v. Fox Publ’ns, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 872, 873  
(S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
 228 See Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 229 See Filmation, 486 F. Supp. 1273. 
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have guided, but ultimately user-generated, stories in the form of a 
video game,230 there are no comparable elements, only milieu, 
name and costumes.  The Super Stud and Wonder Wench case sets 
out a test for comparing costumes. 
5. 1984: Super Stud and Wonder Wench: Seven Costume 
Elements are Enough 
Unlimited Monkey Business franchised singing telegram 
companies to perform skits, including two that featured characters 
called Super Stud and Wonder Wench.231  DC Comics pursued 
them under trademark and copyright theories for infringing 
Superman and Wonder Woman.232  The court described the 
distinctive Superman costume as having seven essential 
components: “(1) blue, skin-tight suit (2) with a yellow five-sided 
shield on the chest, (3) emblazoned with the red letter “S”; (4) a 
red cape, (5) trunks, and (6) boots; and (7) a gold belt.”233  The 
Super Stud costume was similarly described, differing from 
Superman only in the color of the boots, which were black.234  
Wonder Woman was also described on the basis of seven costume 
elements.235  Having selected seven elements and described each 
element with a level of specificity, the costumes were found to be 
 
 230 See, e.g., Trey Walker, City of Heroes Q&A, GAMESPOT, Oct. 8, 2001, 
http://www.gamespot.com/pc/rpg/cityofheroes/news.html?sid=2816738. 
 231 DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 112 
(N.D. Ga. 1984). 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at 112 (numbering added). 
 234 Id. at 114. 
 235 Id. 
In virtually every issue, WONDER WOMAN has worn a costume of patriotic 
colors and symbols comprising (1) a red top bearing gold, wing-tipped insignia; 
(2) a gold and white star-spangled bottom; and (3) red boots.  The costume 
consistently has also included the following important accessories: (4) a gold 
tiara headband with a red star on it (which also serves as a radio receiver); (5) a 
magic lasso or rope which she wraps around her captives to compel them to tell 
the truth; (6) a gold belt which enables WONDER WOMAN to compel 
obedience; and (7) wrist bracelets on each arm, often used to deflect bullets. 
Id. at 113 (numbering added).  For a visual illustration of this costume element 
breakdown, visit this Note’s companion website at http://www.brittonpayne.com/ 
Marvel.html (last visited April 11, 2006). 
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sufficiently similar when six of the seven elements were the 
same.236 
When the court looked at actions taken by the copyrighted 
characters, the most significant factor was the extent to which the 
actions served as “identifying elements,”237 an analysis that 
implicates consumer confusion and resonates in trademark rather 
than copyright.238  The court also analyzed similarity between the 
skits and the original superhero works with a four-part test based 
on the (1) plot structure, (2) phrases, (3) costumes and 
(4) names.239  The court found the sketches to be little more than 
an adaptation of DC Comics’ original work and not protected by a 
defense of fair use parody.240  The injunction restricted activities 
that threatened both trademark and copyright interests. 
6. 1983: Greatest American Hero: Visual Impression is 
Dominant; Powers are Copyrightable! 
In response to the success of the Superman movies of the 
1970s, American Broadcasting Corporation (“ABC”) aired the 
superhero television program “The Greatest American Hero.”241  
On the show, the character Ralph Hinkley found a colorful and 
caped costume that endowed the wearer with incredible powers, 
but lost the instruction manual.242  The show’s three seasons 
followed his misadventures as he struggled to master the powers of 
the suit while trying to do good.243  Hinkley’s costume bore little 
resemblance to the Superman’s, but Warner Brothers and its 
newly-acquired subsidiary DC Comics sued ABC and the show’s 
producer Stephen J. Cannell Productions on copyright 
 
 236 See id. at 115, 117. 
 237 Id. at 112. 
 238 For a further discussion of the separability of copyright and trademark elements in 
character (specifically Superman) as it relates to the reversion of copyright, see Kogan, 
supra note 71. 
 239 See Unlimited Monkey Business, 598 F. Supp. at 117. 
 240 See id. at 119. 
 241 See Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos. 720 F.2d 231, 235-6 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 242 See id. at 236–7. 
 243 See GreatestAmericanHero.com, Series Info, http://www.greatestamericanhero.com/ 
main.aspx (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). 
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infringement and unfair competition theories.244  Although the 
claims raised involved many aspects of intent in the creation and 
promotion of “The Greatest American Hero,”245 the case ultimately 
turned on whether Hinkley was sufficiently similar to Superman 
for the claim to survive summary judgment.246 
In analyzing the similarity between the two superheroes, the 
court “considered not only the visual resemblance but also the 
totality of the characters’ attributes and traits.”247  The court 
suggested that the powers of the characters should be analyzed for 
substantial similarity, rather than dismissed as unprotectable 
ideas.248  “[I]f a character strongly resembled Superman but 
displayed some trait inconsistent with the traditional Superman 
image,” such as villainy, a jury could find infringement.249 
Ironically, the court did not perceptibly follow its own rule.  
This case dealt with a character strongly resembling Superman 
who displayed a trait inconsistent with the traditional Superman 
image, in that Hinkley was inexperienced.250  However, the court 
denied the jury the opportunity to hear the case and determine 
whether this was an act of infringement.251  The standard for 
superhero infringement set by this case looks at the way the 
 
 244 See Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d at 237–38. 
 245 ABC had tried to buy the rights to make a Superman television show, and when 
rebuffed, set out to create its own version.  Id. at 236.  ABC assigned Cannell the pitch 
for a show about “what happens when you become Superman.” Id. at 236.  The first 
design for the costume was “a beige and yellow outfit with a white collar and ‘fold-up 
wings,’” but Cannell rejected it in favor of “a red and black outfit with a cape, somewhat 
similar to Superman’s red and blue costume.” See id. at 246.  ABC then promoted the 
series using familiar catch-phrases and distinctive music from the Superman movies. See 
id. at 237–38. 
 246 See id. at 235. 
 247 Id. at 241. 
 248 “A character is an aggregation of the particular talents and traits his creator selected 
for him. That each one may be an idea does not diminish the expressive aspect of the 
combination.” Id. at 243. 
 249 Id. at 243.  Such an ambiguous analysis led to the conclusion that a competent 
Superman look-alike with similar powers who was a bad guy might be an infringement.  
An incompetent character, however, that did not look like Superman but had similar 
powers and was a good guy could not infringe as a matter of law. See id. 
 250 See id.  Superman has verve and dash, Hinkley is perplexed and bumbling. See id. 
 251 See id. at 243.  Since Hinkley did not have the “total concept and feel” of Superman, 
ABC had made sufficient changes from its Superman starting point, and no reasonable 
jury could find substantial similarity. See id. at 241. 
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allegedly infringing hero “looks and acts.”252  However, it fails to 
provide a guide for an analysis of appearance, and the guidance it 
provides for an analysis of behavioral characteristics is nearly 
impossible to follow.253  The court discusses physical attributes 
and costume design,254 but gives little indication as to how the 
weight of the appearance and behavior of the character are 
balanced in the decision-making.  The court goes to great lengths 
to establish behavior as a proper determinant of substantial 
similarity in superheroes.255  The extent and detail of the 
discussion suggest that behavior was more important to the 
decision than the clearly differing appearance of the characters.  
The discussion of the differences in “total concept and feel” of the 
central characters of Superman and Hinkley applied to both the 
issue of likelihood of confusion and the issue of copyright 
infringement.256  The court cited the similarity of costume 
necessary for infringement standard with the Debbie Does Dallas 
case, where the pornographic film used “distinctive uniforms 
‘almost identical’ with those of [the Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders].”257  In spite of Judge Learned Hand’s guidance, that 
“no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his 
work he did not pirate,”258 the court focused on the substantial 
differences rather than the substantial similarities.259  The claim of 
similarity in total concept and feel was “plainly” dismissed by 
“visual comparison of the works in question.”260 
The driving concern seemed to be the retraction of intellectual 
property protection.  In its final paragraph, the court notes that 
 
 252 Id. at 243. 
 253 Id. at 241. 
 254 See id. at 239–43.  Hinkley is “of medium height with a slight build and curly, 
somewhat unkempt blond hair.” Id. at 236.  The costume is “a red leotard with a tunic 
top, no boots, and a black cape.” Id.  For further comparison of the characters, visit this 
Note’s companion website at http://www.brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2006). 
 255 See id. at 243. 
 256 See id. at 246. 
 257 See id. at 248, citing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 
604 F.2d 200, 204–05 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1979) 
 258 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936). 
 259 See Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d at 241. 
 260 See id. at 247. 
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ABC was “surely entitled to urge the District Judge that creativity 
and competition could be chilled by the prospect of defending 
litigation like this suit.”261  This chilling should also be a concern 
for future superhero infringement cases, but should not justify the 
inclusion of unprotectable ideas like good deeds, flight, and 
invulnerability into the discussion of substantial similarity.  These 
are scènes à faire.  The court came to the right conclusion that the 
Hinkley character did not infringe the Superman character, but did 
so for the wrong reasons by moving beyond milieu and appearance 
to include powers.262 
7. 2000: Flex Mentallo: Parody Can Protect Obvious Copying 
of a Character 
Charles Atlas sued DC Comics for its clear copying of the 
famous “Hero of the Beach” advertisement, where a skinny kid 
gets revenge on his sand-kicking tormentor by developing a 
muscular physique using the Atlas bodybuilding courses.263  
DC Comics used a copying of the advertisement as the origin for 
its new hero Flex Mentallo in the pages of their comics Doom 
Patrol and the subsequent Flex Mentallo.264  Since the 
advertisement was not protected by copyright, Atlas sued on a 
trademark theory.265  The court noted that DC Comics “replicate[d] 
 
 261 See id. at 248. 
 262 In my opinion, the court also wrongly decided the case.  Warner Brothers and DC 
Comics had ample evidence to show that there was a possibility of substantial similarity 
between the characters.  Even if the ultimate result would have been the same, the 
plaintiffs deserved a jury trial.  ABC and Cannell’s questionable promotion practices and 
bad intent made a colorable claim for unfair competition and confusion.  This could have 
led a jury to find infringement similar to that found in Filmation. 
 263 See Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000); see also Gene Kannenberg, Jr., The Ad That Made an Icon Out of Mac, HOGAN’S 
ALLEY, http://www.cagle.com/hogan/features/atlas.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 2005) 
(detailing the history and incarnations of the Atlas advertisement and its parodies). 
 264 See Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 332.  Compare, e.g., Hey SKINNY! . . . Yer Ribs are 
Showing!, DETECTIVE COMICS 182, at Inside Back Cover (Nat’l Comics Publ’ns Apr. 
1952) and Charles Atlas, Our Museum, http://charlesatlas.com/classicads2.htm (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2006) with, Grant Morrison, Mike Dringenberg, Doug Hazlewood & 
Daniel Vozzo, Musclebound, DOOM PATROL (VOL. 3) 42, at 5 (DC Comics Mar. 1991).  
See also Grant Morrison, Frank Quitely & Tom McCraw, After the Fact, Part One: 
Flowery Atomic Heart, FLEX MENTALLO 1 (DC Comics June 1996). 
 265 See Atlas, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 333. 
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key elements of the artwork and dialogue,” including layout, 
costume, and the phrase “Hero of the Beach.”266 
In spite of the “obvious visual resemblance,”267 there was an 
equally obvious parody.  Thus, the application of the Lanham Act 
was construed narrowly, balancing the public interest in free 
expression against the public interest in avoiding consumer 
confusion.268  DC Comics had expressly tried to copy the Atlas 
characters for its purposes, and the court simply accepted the 
substantial similarity between Flex Mentallo and Mac as 
“indisputable.”269  The court’s analysis was strongly influenced by 
DC Comics’ intent behind its copying.270  In spite of the ultimate 
ruling that the expression was protected as parody,271 the intent to 
copy made a finding of copying that much more compelling.272 
NCsoft and Cryptic would not likely be able to avail 
themselves of a fair use defense on the grounds of parody.273  Their 
attempt to create a world of superheroes is sincere and is not 
critical in any way.  There may be other fair use arguments, but as 
discussed later in this note, they will not likely succeed.274 
 
 266 Atlas was troubled that DC Comics’ advertisement, which ended with the newly 
muscular Mac punching the other boy for being a bully, was turned into a scenario with 
the newly muscular character punching the girl in the face for being a shallow tramp. See 
id. at 332.  For further comparison of the Atlas advertisement and Flex Mentallo’s origin, 
visit this Note’s companion website at http://www.brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 267 See id. 
 268 See id. at 337. 
 269 See id. at 332.  The court does, however, note that the muscular man in leopard-skin 
trunks is not exclusive to Atlas as much as it describes Tarzan, challenging the originality 
of the Atlas character. See id. at 341 n.16. 
 270 See id. at 340. 
 271 Id. at 340–41. 
 272 Had the work been protected by copyright, the result would not likely have been 
different. 
 273 “Modern dictionaries accordingly describe a parody as a ‘literary or artistic work that 
imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule,’” 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1172 (quoting AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1317 (3d ed. 1992)).  City of Heroes is not attempting to ridicule 
superhero culture but to embrace and profit from it. See Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to 
Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 1–2. 
 274 See infra Part I.C. 
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8. 2000: Black Nova: Fully realized 
During Marvel’s bankruptcy proceeding, one of their former 
writers and editors Marv Wolfman filed a pro se proof of claim 
asserting ownership over many Marvel characters, including “The 
Man Called Nova.”275  Wolfman had previously published a 
character called “Black Nova” whom he claimed was the same as 
the Nova character he had introduced at Marvel.276  Black Nova 
appeared in two 1967 issues of Wolfman’s fan-magazine 
(“fanzine”) “Super Adventures.”277  A Man Called Nova was 
introduced by Wolfman in an eponymous Marvel comic book 
in 1976.278  Wolfman claimed Nova was thus not created under the 
work-for-hire agreements he had signed with Marvel and that he 
owned the character.  Although there was contractual evidence that 
Wolfman had no claim, the court compared Black Nova with The 
Man Called Nova to see if the preexisting character was “ready for 
publication” and thus was not an original contribution under the 
Marvel work-for-hire agreement.279  Under this theory, if Black 
Nova and The Man Called Nova were sufficiently similar, they 
would fall under the “Siegel exception” and Wolfman would own 
rights in both.280  If they were sufficiently different, then the 
character introduced to Marvel was new and was created under a 
 
 275 See In re Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc, 254 B.R. 817, 820, 824 (D. Del. 2000). 
 276 See id. at 824; see also Nova’s Prime Page, Genesis Of Nova: The Evolution of 
Marvel’s Ultimate Super-Hero!, http://home.mchsi.com/~nova64/star.htm (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2006). 
 277  Marvel Entm’t Group, 254 B.R. at 824. 
 278 See id.  Compare Len Wein, Marv Wolfman, Who Can Defeat a God?, SUPER 
ADVENTURES 7, at 7 (Marvin Wolfman 1967) with Marv Wolfman, John Buscema, Joe 
Sinnott & Michele Wolfman, Nova, THE MAN CALLED NOVA 1, at 1 (Marvel Comics 
Group Sept. 1976), reprinted in MARV WOLFMAN ET AL., ESSENTIAL NOVA VOLUME ONE 
(Marvel Comics 2006).  A side-by-side comparison of the characters is available at this 
Note’s companion website, http://brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html (last visited Apr. 11, 
2006). 
 279 See Marvel Entm’t Group, 254 B.R. at 828–32. 
 280 See id. at 829. “[C]iting Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 
909 (2d Cir. 1974), Wolfman contends that because he developed Nova, Janus, Skull the 
Slayer, Blade, and Deacon Frost prior to his employment with Marvel, the characters 
were not made at Marvel’s instance and expense.” Id.  Thus, the works were not works 
for hire, and were properly owned by him and not Marvel. 
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work-for-hire agreement, which would deny Wolfman any rights 
to the character.281 
The court establishes six factors for finding similarity between 
superheroes: name, powers, costume, background story, 
personality, and mission.282  The names and costumes were clearly 
similar.283  However the court found that the background stories 
and powers were different, and that Black Nova had no clearly 
defined mission at all.284  There was no analysis of the 
personalities.285  This led the court to find in Marvel’s favor—that 
A Man Called Nova was sufficiently different from Black Nova to 
be considered an original and non-infringing character.286  This 
result seems to be based on a desire to settle the bankruptcy case 
without the Wolfman complication, rather than on whether the two 
characters actually were substantially the same.287 
The court’s finding that Black Nova and The Man Called Nova 
were not substantially similar is indefensible to the point of 
absurdity—even upon its own description.  However, the case 
provides a good framework for determining which features are 
appropriate for comparison of superheroes, in particular, power 
combinations.  The court’s analysis ignores the fact that with the 
thousands of superhero and supervillain properties, the 
combinations of powers are so widely reproduced in comic book 
practice that it is almost ensured that there will be no exclusive use 
of particular power combinations, no matter how innovative.288  
 
 281 See id. at 829–32. 
 282 See id. at 824. 
 283 Id. at 831. 
 284 Id. 
 285 See id. 
 286 See id. 
 287 The degree of character development required in a superhero case is a considerably 
lower obstacle as articulated by Judge Posner in Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F. 3d 
(7th Cir. 2004), discussed infra in Part I.A.9. 
 288 The early Justice League of America charter acknowledges the frequency of power 
replication by forbidding duplication of powers among its membership, although the 
initial reason for denying membership to Hawkgirl was based on a “one new member at a 
time” clause. See Gardner Fox, Mike Sekowsky & Bernard Sachs, Riddle of the Runaway 
Room!, JUSTICE LEAGUE OF AMERICA 31 (DC Comics, Nov. 1964), reprinted in GARDNER 
FOX ET AL., JUSTICE LEAGUE OF AMERICA ARCHIVES: VOLUME FIVE (DC Comics 1999).  
For readers concerned with comic book minutiae, the power duplication clause was 
subsequently changed under duress to allow membership to Hawkman’s identically-
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The industry has tolerated power duplication where other elements 
are different, like costume and name.289  However, duplication of 
other elements is not excused by power differentiation,290 so 
powers should not be a significant factor in superhero analysis.291 
9. 2004: Medieval Spawn: Appearance is Everything 
Gaiman v. McFarlane offers insight to the protections afforded 
characters in general, and superheroes in particular.292  Todd 
McFarlane created a comic book featuring his new character 
Spawn, but was criticized for his writing skills,293 so he brought on 
Neil Gaiman to write an issue.294  Gaiman wrote three new 
characters in the issue, penciled by McFarlane, including a 
predecessor of the lead character later dubbed Medieval Spawn.295  
Due to contractual issues, the case turned on whether Gaiman was 
a co-creator, and whether Medieval Spawn was a copy of Spawn, 
or a new derivative character.296  Judge Posner found that similar 
characters without sufficiently substantial differences may be 
considered derivative.297  Of course, a derivative character created 
without the permission of the owner of the copyright in the 
underlying character infringes upon the holder’s rights.298  The 
“doctrine [of scènes à faire] teaches that ‘a copyright owner can’t 
 
powered wife Hawkgirl. See Steve Englehart, Dick Dillin, Frank McLaughlin & Anthony 
Tollin, Inner Mission!, JUSTICE LEAGUE OF AMERICA 146 (DC Comics Sept. 1977).  The 
story is summarized at Scott Tipton, Comics 101: Final Recruits—The Justice League Of 
America, Part IV, MOVIE POOP SHOOT, Feb. 2. 2005 http://www.moviepoopshoot.com/ 
comics101/101.html. 
 289 See infra Part I.B. 
 290 Id. 
 291 See infra Part VI.D. and accompanying notes. 
 292 See 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 293 See id.at 649; see also Todd McFarlane & Steve Oliff, Questions, SPAWN 1 (Image 
Comics, May 1992) (first appearance of Spawn), reprinted in TODD MCFARLANE ET AL., 
SPAWN COLLECTION VOLUME ONE (Image Comics 2005). 
 294 See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 649. 
 295 See id. at 650; see also Neil Gaiman, Todd McFarlane, Steve Oliff & Reuben Rude, 
Angela, SPAWN 9 (Image Comics, Mar. 1993) (first appearance of Angela, Medieval 
Spawn, and Cagliostro). 
 296 See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 652, 661. 
 297 Id. 
 298 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (defining a copyright holder’s rights as to derivative 
works). 
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prove infringement by pointing to features of his work that are 
found in the defendant’s work as well but that are so rudimentary, 
commonplace, standard, or unavoidable that they do not serve to 
distinguish one work within a class of works from another.’”299  
Although the discussion focused on stock characters, the analysis 
appropriately parallels a discussion of stock powers, such as those 
implicated in Marvel v. NCsoft.  The listing of powers and 
attributes may be a description of an unprotectable stock character, 
and may only become sufficiently distinctive to be copyrightable 
and subject to infringement analysis when drawn and named.300 
B. When Comparing Superheroes, Look at Names, Costumes and 
Text, Not Powers or Plots 
When determining infringement in the milieu of superheroes, 
character names will be evaluated under traditional trademark 
analysis, which seeks to avoid consumer confusion and protect 
earned good will.301  Specific expressions of superheroes, like 
costumes, panels and dialogue, will be analyzed under traditional 
copyright law, such that if there is substantial similarity in the 
specific drawings or dialogue, there is infringement.  In spite of the 
Greatest American Hero case,302 power combinations and general 
motivation are scènes à faire, and should not enter the analysis 
when determining infringement in superheroes.  Characters with 
identical powers and motivations should not be found to infringe if 
they have sufficiently different names and costumes. 
In an infringement suit involving a video game like City of 
Heroes, in which the player designs his character within the 
game’s parameters and creates his own dialogue,303 courts have an 
opportunity to analyze the copying of characters almost completely 
 
 299 Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659, (citing Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 
923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 300 See id. at 661. 
 301 See Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000) (imposing liability on a 
person whose mark used in the sale of a product is “likely to cause confusion”); Polaroid 
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (detailing factors for 
evaluating the likelihood of confusion). 
 302 See supra Part I.A.6. 
 303 See CITY OF HEROES GAME MANUAL 5–11, 110–13 (Cryptic Studios, Inc. and NCsoft 
Corp. 2004), available at http://www.cityofheroes.com/gameinfo/documentation.html. 
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apart from the works in which they originally appeared.  Prior 
cases have looked to copying of panel art, character behaviors, and 
dialogue304 none of which is implicated in a video game, where the 
poses, actions and text are determined by the user.  Costume 
should be the prime determinant when looking for substantial 
similarity between protected superheroes and those which are 
allegedly infringing.  Because of technological limitations of the 
genre at its inception, simple, brightly colored and costumes are 
standard and defining genre identifiers.  The industry has two 
major players, DC Comics and Marvel, who have essentially 
duplicated many of each other’s characters in every aspect except 
name and costume, without bothering to engage in legal action.305  
This détente should be ratified in the courts when comparing 
superheroes in a substantial similarity analysis.306  If the names and 
costumes are sufficiently different, there should be no finding of 
infringement, regardless of other similarities in origin, demeanor, 
or “mission.”307  Where there is substantial similarity in costume, 
character infringement is appropriately found.  Intent to copy 
should be a thumb on the scale in this equation where the question 
of substantial similarity is a close one.308 
The similarity should be judged in the context of the infringing 
medium, not the infringed medium.  For example, a City of Heroes 
character that is allegedly infringing should not be compared to the 
comic book version of that character, but to what a direct 
translation of the character into the video game would look like.  
Without knowing more than is seen in the exhibits submitted by 
Marvel, it is clear that the Hulk and Wolverine characters 
infringe.309  A licensed City of Heroes Incredible Hulk would be an 
 
 304 See supra Part I.A. and accompanying notes. 
 305 See infra Part VI.D. 
 306 Cf. Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *1, *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 18, 2002).  This case confronted the question of whether legal possession of Barry 
Bonds record-breaking home run should be influenced by fan expectation for the ordinary 
ball hit into the stands. “There is no reason for the legal rule to be inconsistent with that 
expectation.” Id. at *5. 
 307 Dialogue and panels are, of course, subject to traditional copyright analysis. See 
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
 308 The margins are more carefully considered infra Part VI.B.–C. 
 309 See Exhibit L, Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCsoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253-RGK (PLAx) 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/Marvel_v_NCSoft/ 
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oversized male with green skin, purple short pants and no other 
significant costume elements.  Where that combination appears in 
the game without approval, it infringes Marvel’s rights in the 
character.  Due to present technical limitations, the City of Heroes 
Creation Engine would not allow a hypothetical authorized 
Wolverine to have precisely the same costume he has in his 
original incarnation in comic books.310  Therefore, it is appropriate 
to compare the allegedly infringing character and the closest 
manifestation possible of that character in the video game. 
C. The City of Heroes User-Created Characters Directly Infringe 
For copyright protection, materials must be copyrightable.311  
Little guidance exists to assist in determining whether a character 
is copyrightable.  Some courts may do a filtration test, sifting out 
the unprotectable elements to rule only on infringement of the 
sufficiently original elements.312  In some cases, the combination 
of elements itself may be the original creation, even if all of the 
individual parts are from the public domain, so others are free to 
use the elements as long as they don’t copy the combination.313  
Evidence of copying can be inferred by evidence of access and 
substantial similarity.314 
The characters at issue are copyrightable as a matter of law.315  
Because of the widespread penetration of Marvel superheroes in 
the popular culture, especially among consumers of video games, 
access would not be difficult to show.  A character in a video game 
that is inspired by a movie or comic book character may infringe 
on the rights of the character’s owner as a copy, or as an 
 
ExhL.pdf; Exhibit O, Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCSoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253-RGK 
(PLAx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/Marvel_v_ 
NCSoft/ExhO.pdf. 
 310 Wolverine’s distinctive flared headgear, boots and claw-mark-bedecked torso can be 
approximated but not duplicated by the Creation Engine. 
 311 See, e.g., Sapon v. DC Comics, 00 Civ. 8992, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5395, at *15 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002). 
 312 See, e.g., id. at *20–26. 
 313 See id. at *27.  For example, there are 88 keys on a piano, none of which can be 
copyrighted, but an original combination of them can be. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 
388 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (Graber, J., dissenting). 
 314 See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900–01 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 315 See, e.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 648, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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unauthorized derivative work if it is not an exact copy but is 
materially similar.316  Either violation carries the same liability.317  
Although there are many tests for determining substantial 
similarity with superheroes, it is ultimately an ad hoc analysis.318  
The copying of names is not prohibited by copyright, but can be 
evidence of intent to infringe.319  In comparing the characters 
created in City of Heroes by Marvel320 with their copyrighted 
characters, it would be difficult to find that there is not sufficient 
similarity, based on the prior comparisons found above.321 
Substantial similarity between an allegedly infringing character 
and the protected character’s translation into the new medium is 
not the only form of character infringement in a MMORPG.  A 
City of Heroes character that is significantly different from a 
protected character but could be identified as a derivative 
character, such as “Mutant Winnie the Pooh,”322 would also 
infringe.323  City of Heroes may be on the hook not only for users 
who intend to create the closest facsimiles of the protected 
characters that they can, but also for users’ intentional 
interpretations and derivations of those characters. 
 
 316 See, e.g., id. at 661. 
 317 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)–(2) (2000) (granting the copyright holder the exclusive 
rights to reproduce a copyrighted work and to create derivative works). 
 318 See supra Part I.A. and accompanying notes. 
 319 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures Int’l, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134, 1141 
(C.D. Cal. 1982). 
 320 As part of its case, Marvel intentionally created characters in City of Heroes based on 
their own protected characters to justify their DMCA claim. See Ruling on Marvel’s 
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 2.  The screen captures of these 
characters are posted in this Note’s companion website, at http://brittonpayne.com/ 
Marvel.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 321 See supra Part I.A and accompanying notes. 
 322 See, e.g., Crey Industries, Hero Threat Database: Mutant Pooh, 
http://www.creyindustries.com/viewhero.php?id=10783 (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). 
 323 Cf. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 648, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).  But see Castle 
Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc. 150 F.3d 132, 143 n.9 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(noting that even when one work is “based upon” another, “if the secondary work 
sufficiently transforms the expression of the original work such that the two works cease 
to be substantially similar, then the secondary work is not a derivative work and, for that 
matter, does not infringe the copyright of the original work”). 
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D. City of Heroes Implicates Direct Infringement through Joint 
Ownership 
In addition, City of Heroes could potentially be a direct 
infringer as a joint author of the user-generated character.  This 
potentially exposes Cryptic and NCsoft to a great deal more 
liability than is considered in the Marvel complaint.  Ordinarily, 
when two parties work together to create a single work, they are 
considered joint authors of the work.324  A comic book writer and 
artists contribute in different ways to the creation of a new 
character, and jointly own that character.325  In a video game 
context, this might imply joint ownership of characters created by 
the user’s selection of elements provided by the game.  Such a 
character created with contributions from the player and the game 
could be found a joint work, wholly-owned by both the user and 
the game-maker, subjecting the game-maker to liability for direct 
infringement. 
Another view is that the game is only providing its users with 
character elements (powers, body-types, colors, patterns and 
symbols) from the public domain, so the game-maker’s 
contribution is not what makes the character infringing.  However, 
the game-maker may subsequently own the character according to 
the EULA.  The game-maker may be directly infringing, as it 
acquires the rights and responsibilities of the user as a joint or 
independent creator.  Alternatively, the EULA may be crafted such 
that the game-makers do not take ownership of infringing works 
and do not claim rights to joint works that infringe. 
A close reading of a EULA might suggest that a game operator 
assumes all rights to the materials created.  If there is no right to 
create infringing characters, then by the terms of the EULA, they 
do not take over the right.  But if there is no prohibition on the 
creation of infringing characters and the game-makers thus do take 
the rights of the infringing character, then the game-maker may not 
be able to claim the safe harbors of the DMCA, which only protect 
 
 324 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2003) (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors 
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole.”). 
 325 See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659. 
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against claims of secondary liability.  Where a game-maker owns 
the infringing character, they are directly liable. 
Additionally, EULAs can be expected to have indemnity 
clauses, potentially relieving game-makers of liability for the 
actions of their users in violation of third-party intellectual 
property rights.  The City of Heroes EULA includes such an 
indemnity clause in the section on ownership of content.326  It 
indicates that the game-makers own user-created content, including 
characters.327  However, the EULA also suggests that where the 
game-makers are prevented from ownership “by operation of law,” 
they are granted the unlimited right to use the content.328  This 
acknowledgement of “operation of law” may be intended to 
suggest that no ownership transfers in infringing materials.  
However, physical materials that infringe can certainly be sold, 
thus transfer of the intellectual property ownership and its 
attendant responsibilities should not be barred by such “operation 
of law.” 
Game-makers must be careful how they construct their EULAs 
to make clear that they may be joint authors of noninfringing 
works who then assume whole ownership, or that users are 
creating works for hire which they subsequently license from the 
game-makers, but that the game-makers never claim intent to 
create or ownership in infringing works, and are only liable 
secondarily with regards to such works. 
E. Skins: Importing a Superhero Costume 
The City of Heroes software does not stop players with average 
computer skills from hacking the game and playing an infringing 
character.329  Presently, copyrighted and trademarked character 
elements like distinctive logos and costume patterns can be 
brought into a user’s game with readily available instructions.330  
 
 326 See City of Heroes User Agreement, supra note 93, at § 6(c). 
 327 Id. at §§ 6(b)–(c). 
 328 Id. at § 6(c). 
 329 See infra Part I.E. 
 330 Id. 
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This is a common practice in the videogame world,331 and City of 
Heroes is no exception. 
Although it is the only method noted in Marvel’s suit, a 
Creation Engine is not the only way an infringing character can 
appear in a video game.  Computer users can customize the 
appearance of a program by downloading or creating a “skin.”  A 
skin is a graphic file that effectively wraps around a program or 
program element the way a patterned sock wraps around a foot,332 
changing its appearance but not its underlying function.  It has 
become common practice for some players to use skins to create 
their own characters to play in videogames.333  Players use a 
separate program to design a look for a character, and store the 
instructions for creating that look on the hard drive where the game 
searches for approved skins.  When the game is played, it 
substitutes the homemade skin for the licensed skin.334  There are 
websites that allow players to download skins created by others for 
use in their games.335  Although some game-makers encourage the 
use of skins, many forbid the practice in the interest of protecting 
the integrity of their game and the underlying character properties.  
This practice is the source of a lawsuit where skins were used to 
make the characters in a volleyball video game appear naked.336 
 
 331 Id. 
 332 See Alex’s Freedom Fortress, Alex’s Fantastically Fabulous Freedom Force FAQ: 
Skins and Meshes, http://www.alexff.com/faq.htm#16._What_are_Skins_What_are_ 
Meshes (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). 
 333 See id. (displaying hundreds of skins used by players of the video game Freedom 
Force). 
 334 See id. 
 335 See, e.g., Alex’s Freedom Fortress, http://www.alexff.com/ (last visited  
Dec. 5, 2005).  Alex’s Freedom Fortress offers hundreds of unapproved skins of 
superhero properties for the superhero video game Freedom Force. Id.  For a more 
thorough discussion of the use of skins, see Alex’s Freedom Fortress, Alex’s 
Fantastically Fabulous Freedom Force FAQ: Skins and Meshes, http://www.alexff.com/ 
faq.htm#16._What_are_Skins_What_are_Meshes (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). 
 336 See David Becker, Game Maker Sues Over Nude Volleyball, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 
10, 2005, http://news.com.com/Game+maker+sues+over+nude+volleyball/2100-1043_3-
5571234.html.  Compare Saiyaman.info, Dead or Alive Wallpaper, 
http://www.saiyaman. info/ gallery/displayimage.php?album=7&pos=16 (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2005) (unaltered screenshots from the game) with Prostar Games, Dead or Alive 
Xtreme Beach Volleyball—Nude/Topless mode, Dec. 15, 2004, http://prostar-
games.com/ (the offending ‘nude’ versions).  The parent company of Tecmo, the game-
maker discussed in Becker, supra, won a similar case in Japan two years ago in which it 
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City of Heroes can be similarly manipulated.337  The Creation 
Engine has a selection of over one hundred logo choices, none of 
which infringe any copyright.338  Independent websites offer free 
files that can replace one of the logos that the game initially offers, 
allowing the user more choices, including the Spider-man logo, 
Batman’s chest logo and the Superman “S”-shield.339  To find 
similarity in superhero logos, the court will only need to look at 
“substantial similar[ity] to the eye of an ordinary consumer.”340  
Because City of Heroes skins are stored on the user’s computer, 
they are not visible to players on other machines, or to the City of 
Heroes game operators.341  With widespread skin use and the 
current technical specifications, users can easily play whatever 
characters they want on any game platform, using protected 
characters without going through licensed channels at all. 
Another form of skinning can potentially be used in City of 
Heroes.  A user can spend the time to create the visual image of a 
character, then forward that particular combination of appearance 
characteristics to another user, or post it online at an infringing 
tutorial site.  Marvel has already pursued users who distributed 
 
sued distributors of a naked hack for the action game “Dead or Alive II.” Becker, supra; 
Mucho Sucko, Naked Dead or Alive 2, http://www.muchosucko.com/video-
nakeddeadoralive2.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
 337 Some news reports incorrectly suggest that skins cannot be used in City of Heroes. 
Compare Matt Brady, Marvel Sues City of Heroes Producers, NEWSARAMA.COM, 
http://newsarama.com/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=21377 (last visited  
Dec. 5, 2005), with, e.g., Coldfront, City of Heroes Costume Mods, 
http://coh.coldfront.net/index.php/content/category/10/73/63/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2005). 
The whole process is illustrated in this Note’s companion website, at 
http://brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 338 The selection of letters of the alphabet, abstract designs, and public domain symbols 
is illustrated in this Note’s companion website, at http://brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 339 See, e.g., Coldfront, supra note 337. 
 340 See DC Comics, Inc v. Bobtron Int’l, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 4358, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9107, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1990) (citing Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics 
Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977)) (comparing a watch with a white bat-logo on 
a black background and the copyrighted Batman emblem). 
 341 For a tutorial and some examples, see City of Heroes Guru, City of Heroes Guru 
Forum, http://www.cohguru.com/forum/showthread.php?t=1824 (last visited Jan. 26, 
2006). 
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skins for the superhero video game Freedom Force.342  It has not 
yet pursued City of Heroes for allowing its rogue users to hack its 
software to create even closer representations of its characters.  
The legal issues raised with regards to skins would be similar to 
the claims Marvel brought, even though the factual inquiry would 
focus on a more sophisticated user.  NCsoft and Cryptic are surely 
aware of consumer use of skins as well as their creation of 
infringing characters through the Creation Engine.  However, 
pending terms of the settlement, City of Heroes is not adequately 
preventing either activity in order to protect the interests of the 
copyright holders. 
F. The Super Hero and Super Villain Trademarks Should be 
Generic 
Part of the inducement problem for NCsoft and Cryptic Studios 
is the difficulty in describing their product to consumers.  Any 
typical person describing City of Heroes would call it something 
like “the superhero video game.”343  Unfortunately, City of Heroes 
is forced to dance around the term “super hero,” because it is a 
trademark co-owned by Marvel and DC Comics.344  Because 
inducement is such a significant element in liability analysis for 
third-party infringement under Grokster,345 vendors of superhero 
 
 342 See Matt Brady, Marvel Stomps Skin Site, NEWSARAMA.COM, June 23, 2003, 
http://www.newsarama.com/forums/showthread.php?s=6300d02c8a340e184b36a3c427e
7fe2e&threadid=4234&highlight=skins. 
 343 Superhero: “A figure, especially in a comic strip or cartoon, endowed with 
superhuman powers and usually portrayed as fighting evil or crime.” THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1802 (3d ed., Houghton Mifflin 
Co. 1996).  “A superhero is a fictional character who is noted for feats of courage and 
nobility, who usually has colorful name and costume and abilities beyond those of normal 
human beings.” Wikipedia, Superhero, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superhero (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
 344 Word Mark SUPER HEROES, Serial No. 73222079 (1981); available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm (select “Search Trademarks” under “Get a 
Trademark Registration”; then select “New User Form Search” and enter the term “super 
heroes” into the “Search Term” box; then select the trademark with the corresponding 
serial number); see Brian Cronin, Comic Book Urban Legends Revealed #9!, COMICS 
SHOULD BE GOOD, July 28, 2005, http://goodcomics.blogspot.com/2005/07/comic-book-
urban-legends-revealed-9.html. 
 345 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 
(2005). 
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products not licensed by Marvel or DC Comics run the risk of 
getting tripped up in their efforts to avoid that unreasonable 
trademark restriction, as NCsoft and Cryptic were here. 
The word mark “super hero” and its variants should be deemed 
generic.  When DC Comics and Marvel jointly registered the term 
in 1979,346 “super hero” was already the widespread generic term 
to define a comic book subgenre and its distinctive characters.347  
Because no one challenged the trademark registration, it was 
approved two years later.348  But where a trademarked word has 
“[become] part of the public domain,”349 it is a victim of 
“genericide”—a killing of the distinctiveness of the mark350—and 
can no longer support a claim that it deserves the monopoly 
granted by trademark law on the basis of preventing consumer 
confusion and identifying the source of a product.351  “Super hero” 
is such a mark. 
In a leading case, the trademarked term “Thermos” was held 
generic because the court determined by survey evidence that it 
had entered the public domain.352  In a leading case on genericide 
 
 346 For a full discussion of the trade-marking of the term, see Todd VerBeek, Super-
Heroes® a Trademark of DC and Marvel, BRIEFS ON THE OUTSIDE: THE LAW AND 
COMICS, http://briefs.toddverbeek.com/archives/000152.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2005). 
 347 See, e.g., GERARD JONES, MEN OF TOMORROW: GEEKS, GANGSTERS, AND THE BIRTH 
OF THE COMIC BOOK 74 (Basic Books 2004) (“By 1932 [Street & Smith, publisher of the 
Shadow,] was already preparing more pulps [(novels)] starring crime fighters of 
superhuman prowess and distinct appearance.  Soon its editors had developed an in-house 
word for the type of character: ‘superhero.’”).  The term was used generically in comic 
books as early as 1942. Will Murray, The Pulp Connection: The Roots of the Superman!, 
COMIC BOOK MARKETPLACE, Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 20; see George Marcoux, SUPERSNIPE 
COMICS (VOL. 1) 1, at Cover (Street & Smith Oct. 1942) (picturing a sleeping boy on the 
cover holding a magazine entitled “Super Hero Comics”); Joe Simon & Jack Kirby, The 
Guardian, STAR SPANGLED COMICS 7 (DC Comics Apr. 1942) (first appearance of the 
Guardian and the Newsboy Legion), reprinted in Joe Simon & Jack Kirby, The Newsboy 
Legion, ADVENTURE COMICS DIGEST 503, at Ch. 8 (DC Comics Sept. 1983).  The term 
did not catch on widely in its current usage until the Silver Age of Comics, in the late 
1950s. See Murray, supra. 
 348 See VerBeek, supra note 346. 
 349 King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 350 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 707 (8th ed. 2004). 
 351 See King-Seeley Thermos, 321 F.2d at 579, 581. 
 352 See id. at 579–80. 
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survey evidence,353 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida 
International (the “Teflon” case), each side presented several 
different kinds of surveys supporting their position.354  The court 
identified the test that best determined whether the mark TEFLON 
was appropriately in the public domain as “Teflon Survey B.”355  
There, the surveyor described the categories of “brand name” and 
“common name” with the respective word pair “Chevrolet—
automobile” and asked whether each of eight names was a brand 
name or a common name.”356 
If Teflon Survey B were conducted for “super hero” and “super 
villain,”357 it would be surprising if either term were identified by a 
significant percentage as a brand name.358  “The primary 
significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather 
than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether 
the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or 
services on or in connection with which it has been used.”359  A 
mark shall be deemed to be “abandoned” when, due to any course 
of conduct of the registrant, including acts of omission as well as 
commission, the mark loses its significance as an indication of 
origin.360  “Superhero” has at least become part of the public 
 
 353 JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY KEVLIN, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION LAW 332 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2001). 
 354 393 F. Supp. 502, 518–20 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 355 See id. at 526–27. 
 356 Id.  The survey found at least three out of four people responded “brand name” for 
STP, Jello, and Coke, and “common name” for Margarine, Refrigerator and Aspirin.  Just 
over two-thirds identified Teflon as a brand name.  The people surveyed were fairly 
evenly split on Thermos.  The court found this to be the survey “which really gets down 
to th[e] critical element” of “whether the principal significance of the name [] was ‘its 
indication of the nature or class of an article, rather than an indication of its origin.’” Id. 
at 527 (citing King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 580).  The court found that Teflon was not generic 
because a “substantial majority of the public continues to believe that TEFLON is a brand 
name.” DuPont, 393 F. Supp. at 527.  A previous court had found that Thermos had 
become generic. King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 579. 
 357 Cf. DuPont, 393 F. Supp. at 526–27. 
 358 Even in the almost obsessively sophisticated superhero comic book market, 
consumers are surprised to discover that “super hero” is trademarked. See, e.g., Matt 
Brady, Super Hero Happy Hour Changes Name, NEWSARAMA.COM, Jan. 30, 2004, 
http://newsarama.com/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=8650 (discussing reactions 
to the “Super Hero Happy Hour” comic book cease and desist letter). 
 359 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2000). 
 360 See id. at § 1127. 
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domain if it has not been there since its coinage in the 1930s, and it 
is unfair to unduly restrict the right of a competitor of DC Comics 
and Marvel to use the word.361  There is evidence that DC Comics 
and Marvel have been diligent in their efforts to protect the 
trademark significance of “super hero,”362 as required by Du Pont, 
the leading “genericide” case.363  However, they seem to have 
failed in preventing the mark from becoming principally 
significant as a common noun,364 which is considered under 
DuPont.365  The terms seem to be generic, and thus should be 
available for City of Heroes and any other company offering a 
product based on a “brightly costumed super-powered hero” to use 
in trade. 
Furthermore, there is a strong nominative fair use argument for 
the term “superhero” in the context of City of Heroes.366  The 
Ninth Circuit may be particularly sympathetic to this argument, 
based on their finding in Playboy Enterprises v. Welles.367  Terri 
Welles had been selected “Playboy’s Playmate of the Year 1981,” 
but Playboy objected to her use of the term on her website.368  The 
court found that Welles’ use was nominative fair use, commenting 
that trying to identify Welles for her website without using the 
trademarked phrase was “absurd . . . [t]o describe herself as the 
‘nude model selected by Mr. Hefner’s magazine as its number-one 
prototypical woman for the year 1981’ would be impractical as 
well as ineffectual in identifying Terri Welles to the public.”369  
City of Heroes finds itself in a similar situation, trying to identify a 
 
 361 Cf. King-Seeley, 321 F.2d 577. 
 362 See, e.g., Brady, supra note 358 and accompanying text. 
 363 See DuPont, 393 F. Supp. at 527–28. 
 364 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1802 
(3d ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1996); Wikipedia, Superhero, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Superhero (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 
 365 See DuPont, 393 F. Supp. at 527–28. 
 366 Nominative fair use “acknowledges that it is often virtually impossible to refer to a 
particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference or any other 
such purpose without using [plaintiff’s] mark.” Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pelligrini, 337 
F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). 
 367 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 368 See id. at 799–800. 
 369 Id. at 802. 
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superhero video game to the public without infringing the 
trademarked expression “super hero.” 
It is unreasonable that Marvel should be able to suggest that 
using the phrase “brings alive the world of comic books” is 
inappropriate inducement to infringe when it is just as likely that 
City of Heroes is hamstrung by its inability to use the generic term 
“superhero” to more directly describe its product.  If the term is not 
considered generic, the use of the trademarked term “super hero” 
should be considered nominative fair use for the description of 
superhero products. 
VI. A FAIR FILTERING SOLUTION 
Judge Posner suggests a solution for dealing with enablers in In 
re Aimster Copyright Litigation.370  His law and economics 
analysis suggests that “[i]f a [copyright infringement] can be 
prevented most effectively by actions taken by a third party, it 
makes sense to have a legal mechanism for placing liability for the 
consequences of the breach on him as well as on the party that 
[infringed.]”371  The opinion indicates that companies that facilitate 
infringement, even if they are not infringers themselves, may be 
liable to the copyright owners as contributory infringers.372  
Chasing down the individual infringers is “a teaspoon solution to 
an ocean problem.”373  He outlines a two step process: if (1) there 
is not substantial noninfringing use and (2) filtering is not unduly 
burdensome, then there should be contributory liability.374 
Posner’s solution is inadequate for two reasons.  First, his rigid 
ordering of the potential solutions precludes imposition of a 
filtering solution where infringement does not reach the 
substantiality threshold, even if the filtering solution carries a low 
cost relative to the damage caused by its absence.  A multi-factor 
analysis would instead allow a court to take into account the many 
 
 370 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 371 Id. 
 372 Id. at 645. 
 373 Id. at 645 (citing Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital 
Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 442 (2002)). 
 374 See id. at 653. 
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factors present in a digital infringement case.  Second, Posner’s 
factors do not consider the need to give some technologies room to 
grow to their full potential before imposing filtering solutions that 
may stunt their growth.  His test also does not consider culpability 
for the foreseeability of the new technology infringing intellectual 
property rights and the precedential hazards of not adequately 
preventing infringement in its development. 
A fair solution will adequately balance the interests in 
protecting characters from infringement with the need to avoid a 
potential chilling effect in administration of the game.  The 
following steps will find a fair balance where there is digital 
infringement of character copyright and trademark. 
A. Calibrating Notice and Knockdown for Continuing 
Relationships 
In the context of City of Heroes, Notice and Knockdown 
should be based on the material that is infringed—not the infringer 
or the infringement.  A copyright owner should be able to give 
notice of material that is infringed and knock down the ability to 
infringe.  As it stands, only the infringement is enforced against, 
knocking out the character and in egregious cases, the infringer, 
banning the user.  Since the infringer is generally a fan, Marvel has 
no incentive to punish him375 personally, particularly if it can 
simply prevent him from infringing.376  Marvel’s real goals are to 
prevent NCsoft and Cryptic from benefiting unfairly from the work 
Marvel owns, and from decreasing the value of the future use of its 
 
 375 As most would assume, “95 percent of all comic-book readers are male.” See Julia 
Duin, Comics Still Flying High; Colorful Heroes Deliver Messages Around the World, 
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at A02, available at http://www.nyccomicbookmuseum.org/ 
Wash_Times_2_6.htm.  But see Stevie Case, Women in Gaming, MICROSOFT.COM,  
Jan. 12, 2004 http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/using/games/learnmore/ 
womeningames.mspx (“[W]omen now account for 43% of all computer gamers. . . . 
[R]esearch reveals that 30% of gamers who play more than 10 hours a week are 
female.”). 
 376 A close reading of the settlement press release makes it clear that alienation of the 
fans is a primary concern for Marvel. See Press Release, NC Soft, Marvel Entertainment, 
Inc., NCsoft Corporation, NC Interactive, Inc., Cryptic Studios, Inc. Settle All  
Litigation, (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://www.plaync.com/about/2005/12/ 
marvel_entertai.html; see also Brady, supra note 8 and accompanying responses. 
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properties.377  A filter should recognize the infringement of the 
protected character, and prevent that character from being created 
or used, without requiring notice of the individual infringement. 
B. Name: The Trademark String Solution 
NCsoft and Cryptic already operate a City of Heroes “Block 
List” for the naming aspect of its Creation Engine.378  If a user tries 
to name his character “Hulk,” the program will prevent it, and 
suggest trying another name.  The game-makers may add strings to 
the Block List,379 such that if the word “Hulk” appears in any part 
of the word, it will also be blocked, i.e. “Hulk10.”  This feature 
also prevents the use of obscenities in the character naming.  
Additionally, it has the ability to block out “cobbles,” intentional 
misspellings or combinations of characters that are clearly intended 
to evade the Block List’s purpose, such as “H_U_L_K,” “Hu1k” or 
“HU£K.”380  The Block List can have a feature that understands 
common cobbling techniques, effectively translating the coded 
word back to its proper form and matching it to words on the 
Block List.  It is not truly a list, but an algorithm, a small program 
that evaluates word choices and weeds out the ones that violate the 
rules.  It operates as a filter, which requires periodic updating, but 
is not monitoring, which is not required for the DMCA safe harbor 
provisions.381  It is not unreasonable to expect this filter to follow 
 
 377 In the summer of 2005, Marvel announced a deal with Microsoft to create a licensed 
MMORPG featuring the Marvel characters, and DC Comics has a similar deal with Sony. 
See Schiesel, supra note 46. 
 378 See Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 1. 
 379 Strings in computer language, sometimes represented by the dollar sign ($), stand for 
any number of symbols. Wikipedia.com, Dollar sign, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%24 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2006).  Thus a search for “$Hulk$” would generate results such as 
“Hulk10,” “Mr. Hulk,” or “GreenHulkBoy.” See Wikipedia.com, String (computer 
science), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_string_(computer_science) (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2005). 
 380 Wikepedia.com, Deliberate Misspellings, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberate_ 
misspelling (last visited Dec. 13, 2005); see Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss 
Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 1. 
 381 The DMCA expressly does not require monitoring for Safe Harbor. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(m) (2000) (providing that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to condition 
the applicability of [the DMCA Safe Harbor] on—(1) a service provider monitoring its 
service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent 
consistent with a standard technical measure complying with the [conditions for 
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the same rules that are common in trademark law.  For example, 
“Toys Are Us” would infringe on “Toys R Us.”382  Such 
misspellings and evasions do not escape trademark enforcement,383 
and should not be facilitated by ISPs where there is an efficient 
remedy such as this. 
C. Appearance: The Roy G. Biv 7% Solution 
Character appearances are not so obviously dissembled, but 
they can and should be similarly remedied by an algorithm 
nonetheless.  In the case of City of Heroes, each aspect of the hero 
created comes from a small list of selections.  If the sequence of 
selections begins to resemble a protected set of characteristics (like 
the Incredible Hulk’s giant size, green skin, purple shorts, no other 
clothing), the Creation Engine could deny the final choice that 
would create an infringing character, while preserving enough 
alternatives that the user does not feel frustrated in seeking 
legitimate use.384  This way, infringement has a better chance of 
being nipped in the bud without requiring onerous monitoring. 
An appropriate measure for this is a 7% solution.  A protected 
character is submitted to City of Heroes, as created by the holder 
 
eligibility]”).  Public policy also frowns on a requirement of monitoring because “privacy 
is a social benefit though also a source of social costs.” See In re Aimster Copyright 
Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).  In addition, the same forces that make 
monitoring direct infringers prohibitive for copyright holders, and thus support the 
doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability, see id. at 645, are comparably 
burdensome for game-makers like NCsoft and Cryptic if monitoring were 
requiredregime, see id. at 648–49, and “could result in the shutting down of the service or 
its annexation by the copyright owners . . . because the provider might find it impossible 
to estimate its potential damages liability to the copyright holders and would anyway face 
the risk of being enjoined,” id.  The Sony court was “unwilling to allow copyright holders 
to prevent infringement effectuated by means of a new technology at the price of possibly 
denying noninfringing consumers the benefit of the technology. Id. at 649 (interpreting 
Sony Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). 
 382 Such a solution was mandated in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 
1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[b]oth parties are required to adopt reasonable 
measures to identify variations of the file name, or of the spelling of the titles or artists’ 
names, of plaintiffs’ identified protected works”). 
 383 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). 
 384 The City of Heroes Creation Engine allows approximately “1027 unique character 
configurations.” Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, 
at 1. 
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using the Creation Engine.  Each characteristic’s color value is 
given a range of 7% in one direction, 7% in the other.  This range 
represents a total protected color range of one-seventh, because, at 
its most elementary, there are seven colors on the spectrum: Red, 
Orange, Yellow, Green, Blue, Indigo, Violet.  If the offending final 
piece of the puzzle is green skin, the Creation Engine will block 
the user from choosing any color within 7% of the Incredible Hulk 
green submitted by Marvel.  For the sake of elegance and the need 
to set a limit to this protection, the block would only trigger when 
the character being created threatens to be within 7% of the 
protected character.  Where a Creation Engine facilitates fourteen 
characteristics comprising each costume (boot color, tights color, 
cape color, etc.), if the first twelve are each within the 7% range of 
a protected character, the final two will not be permitted to be 
within the 7% range. 
Moreover, some characteristics make a greater visual 
impression than others, and appropriate weighting should be a part 
of the filtering.  The color of a bracelet will have less overall 
impact in an infringement analysis than will the color of a cape.  
Since the surface area of the character is quantified as a part of the 
process used in the game,385 it would not be difficult to establish a 
percentage value for costume elements.  Like a dress pattern laid 
flat, you can measure the percentage of the infringing fabric used 
by looking at the pattern. 
There are risks to both overenforcement and underenforcement, 
but the 7% Solution serves as a principled guideline that can be 
implemented through filtering, obviating much of the need for 
inefficient monitoring.  The 7% Solution will neither confer 
immunity nor per se liability, but will allow a court to construct 
“adequate filtering” under the DMCA.  It can have application in 
other video games and perhaps beyond.  Where works are created 
using digital techniques like these, assigning a percentage value 
will not be difficult.  The 7% Solution can start as a border, either 
side of which exists a rebuttable presumption of infringement or 
substantial dissimilarity. 
 
 385 See supra Part I.E and accompanying notes. 
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D. Powers: Scènes à Faire 
Although Marvel would certainly like to protect them, power 
combinations should not be protected.  The Creation Engine 
requires the user to go through four steps to choose powers.  The 
choices a user makes under Origin (mutant, science, technology, 
natural and magic) and Archetype (blaster, controller, defender, 
scrapper and tanker) determine the Primary and Secondary powers 
available to a new character (e.g., flamethrower, ice bolt, energy 
punch, mental blast), with more offered to the user as gameplay 
progresses.386 
In their original complaint, Marvel took umbrage at the idea 
that a player could create a “science-based” “tanker” hero just like 
its Incredible Hulk property.387  They also complain that their 
character Wolverine is cloned when the Creation Engine allows a 
user to create a character who (l) is a mutant; (2) is a scrappy 
fighter; (3) has three long metal claws; and (4) has fast-acting 
regenerative powers.388 
These powers are inherently the scènes à faire in the world of 
superheroes, and even exact replication of what makes a protected 
superhero “super” should not rise to the level of infringement.389  
Protection here is equivalent to the protection of an idea, which is 
forbidden under copyright law.390  If one company could lay claim 
to “flight” or “invulnerability,” it would impede commerce.391  
These are the abstractions that form the language of superheroes, 
and ownership of elements of that language would inappropriately 
choke off its use.392  It is common for comparably similar powers 
 
 386 See GAME MANUAL, supra note 303 at 5–9, 30–65. 
 387 Marvel Complaint, supra note 6, at 2. 
 388 See id. at 7. 
 389 See Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos. 720 F.2d 231, 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting 
that even though “Hinkley’s suit invests him with most of Superman’s powers,” he is “a 
different, non-infringing character.”); see also supra Part I.B. 
 390 See, e.g., Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 600 (2nd 
Cir. 1951) (stating that “a copyright never extends to the ‘idea’ of the ‘work,’ but only to 
its ‘expression’”). 
 391 See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 392 The publishers of Superman are “not entitled to a monopoly of the mere character of 
a ‘Superman’ who is a blessing to mankind.” See Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns 
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to appear in characters from different publishers without giving 
rise to any claims of infringement.393  As standard practices of the 
genre suggest that actionable infringement does not arise when 
powers are duplicated, it is appropriate for courts to apply that 
standard to its infringement analysis. 
 
Publ’ns, Inc, 111 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1940) (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 393 In fact, it is somewhat of a tradition for one company to create analogues of another 
company’s characters with the same powers but entirely new names and costumes in 
order to show a new take on the heroes, or how the companies’ heroes might interact. 
Compare, e.g., Gardner Fox, Mike Sekowsky & Bernard Sachs, Starro the Conqueror!, 
THE BRAVE AND THE BOLD 28 (DC Comics Feb.–Mar. 1960) (first appearance of the 
Justice League of America), reprinted in GARDNER FOX, ET AL., JUSTICE LEAGUE OF 
AMERICA ARCHIVES: VOLUME ONE (DC Comics 1997) with Roy Thomas, Sal Buscema & 
Sam Grainger, When Strikes the Squadron Sinister, THE AVENGERS (VOL. 1) 70 (Marvel 
Comics Nov. 1969) (introducing the Squadron Sinister, who later became the Squadron 
Supreme, see Roy Thomas, John Buscema & Frank Giacoia, The World is Not For 
Burning, THE AVENGERS 85, at 8, 11 (Marvel Comics Feb. 1971), Marvel’s authoritarian 
take on DC Comics’ Justice League of America); compare, e.g., Warren Ellis, Bryan 
Hitch, Paul Neary & Laura Depuy, Pay Allegiance to the Authority, THE AUTHORITY 
(VOL. 1) 1 (Wildstorm May 1999) (first appearance of anti-hero supergroup The 
Authority), reprinted in WARREN ELLIS ET AL., THE AUTHORITY VOL. 1: RELENTLESS 
(Rachelle Brissenden & Eric DeSantis eds., Wildstorm 2000) with Joe Kelly, et. al., 
What’s So Funny About Truth, Justice & The American Way?, ACTION COMICS 775 (DC 
Comics Mar. 2001) (showing how DC Comics’ Superman dealt with analogues of 
Wildstorm’s anti-heroes); compare, e.g., Stan Lee, Jack Kirby & Dick Ayers, The 
Coming of the Avengers!, THE AVENGERS (VOL. 1) 1 (Marvel Comics Sept. 1963) (the 
first appearance of The Avengers), reprinted in STAN LEE ET AL., MARVEL 
MASTERWORKS: THE AVENGERS (VOL. 1) (Marvel Entertainment Group 2002) with Mike 
Friedrich, Dick Dillin & Joe Giella, Batman—King of the World, JUSTICE LEAGUE OF 
AMERICA (VOL. 1) 87 (DC Comics Feb. 1971) (introducing the Justifiers, an analogue of 
Marvel’s Avengers); compare, e.g., Stan Lee, Jack Kirby, George Klein & Christopher 
Rule, The Fantastic Four!, FANTASTIC FOUR (VOL. 1) 1 (Marvel Comics Nov. 1961) (the 
first appearance of the Fantastic Four), reprinted in STAN LEE ET AL., FANTASTIC FOUR 
OMNIBUS VOLUME ONE (Marvel Comics, 2005) and Finger, supra note 206 (first 
appearance of the Batman) with, e.g., Kurt Busiek, Brent Anderson & Steven Buccellato, 
In Dreams, KURT BUSIEK’S ASTRO CITY (VOL. 1) 1 (Image Comics Aug. 1995), reprinted 
in KURT BUSIEK ET AL., Life in the Big City, KURT BUSIEK’S ASTRO CITY VOL. 1: LIFE IN 
THE BIG CITY (Homage 1999) and, e.g., Kurt Busiek, Brent Anderson, Will Blyburg & 
Alex Sinclair, New Kid in Town, KURT BUSIEK’S ASTRO CITY (VOL. 2) 4 (Image Comics 
Dec. 1996), reprinted in KURT BUSIEK ET AL., KURT BUSIEK’S ASTRO CITY VOL. 2: 
CONFESSION (Homage 1999) (Kurt Busiek’s creator-owned First Family is his 
reinterpretation of Marvel’s Fantastic Four, and Confessor is his take on DCs Batman).  
A visual illustration of this tradition, including a side-by-side comparison of the above, 
can be found at this Note’s companion website at http://brittonpayne.com/Marvel.html 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
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Where the only similarity between two superheroes consists of 
a duplication of abstract powers, infringement should not be found.  
It is fair to introduce a matched set of powers as evidence of intent 
to infringe, but such evidence should not stand as infringement on 
its own.  There is no need to filter the selection of powers for 
infringement. 
 
E. Cost will Keep Marvel from Protecting More than its Biggest 
Characters 
In order to gain the protection of the proposed 7% Solution and 
string filtering, Marvel will have to effectively register their 
individual properties with City of Heroes.  The registration would 
consist of a code derived from the Creation Engine version of a 
Marvel property (a “Character Code”) submitted to City of Heroes 
for filtering.  Since City of Heroes will simply add the code to its 
7% list in whatever reasonable form it dictates, their labor 
commitment will be negligible after startup, and should be seen as 
a cost of doing business in the intellectual property world.  On the 
other hand, Marvel will create these Character Codes at its own 
expense.  Due to the level of complexity of the Creation Engine, 
each Character Code may take a half-hour or more for a user to 
create,394 with the expected vetting from legal and corporate 
supervisors.  This cost will deter overreaching practices by Marvel 
and serve as a disincentive for Marvel to frivolously protect every 
character in its stable of thousands.  They will only register the 
characters that are worth protecting based on their business 
decisions.  Even if they should decide to protect every one of their 
characters, City of Heroes players will still have plenty of choices, 
comparing the blocked thousands to the remaining trillions 
available.  The Character Codes will not need to be term-limited, 
as the expected periodic changes in the technical specifications of 
the game will likely necessitate new submissions of Character 
 
 394 See, e.g., Nikki Douglas, City of Heroes Review, GRRLGAMER.COM, 
http://www.grrlgamer.com/review.php?g=cityofheroes (last visited Dec. 12, 2005). 
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Codes.  Each advancement will likely result in Marvel’s 
reevaluation of the characters worth protecting.395 
 
VII.THE SONY STANDARD IS OBSOLETE: THE ENABLING 
TECHNOLOGY THEORY OF SECONDARY LIABILITY 
A. Squaring Grokster, Sony, and Secondary Liability for 
Copyright Infringement 
One reading of Grokster suggests that its ruling is an 
elucidation of the inducement factor of a contributory infringement 
claim, such that absent inducement, contributory infringement can 
be found on other grounds, such as substantial participation, 
subject to the Sony safe harbor of substantial noninfringing use.396  
If no contributory infringement is found, a plaintiff could move on 
to a claim of vicarious liability, again applying the Sony analysis.  
This interpretation leads to a complex and overlapping analysis, 
and still does not fully address the need to balance fostering 
beneficial technology with protecting copyright. 
The better reading of Grokster is that it redefines contributory 
infringement as requiring intentional inducement.397  The intent to 
help others break the law is sufficient to confer liability.398  Under 
vicarious liability, the defendant does nothing wrong, but due to a 
financial relationship to the infringing behavior, a duty to stop the 
infringement attaches.399  The Grokster opinion reserved the 
vicarious liability issue theory.400  However, these two theories of 
secondary liability leave a gap where there is neither inducement 
 
 395 City of Heroes has offered several updates since its launch. See, e.g., City of Heroes, 
News: Feature Updates, Issue 5: Forest of Dread—New Power Sets, 
http://www.cityofheroes.com/feature_update7.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2005). 
 396 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2777–79, 
2781 n.12 (2005). 
 397 See id. at 2776 (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 398 See id. at 2779. 
 399 See id. at 2776 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 
307 (2d Cir. 1963)). 
 400 Id. at 2776 n.9. 
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nor financial relationship, but a technology has the potential to 
destroy an intellectual property industry,401 or where a nascent 
technology is threatened by a powerful copyright interest.402  
Rather than try and squeeze this analysis into what may be left of 
contributory infringement absent inducement, that gap could be 
more sensibly filled by a third form of secondary liability analysis, 
touched on by the Sony and Grokster decisions,403 which this Note 
will call the “enabling technology theory of secondary liability.”  
Liability can be fairly conferred where distributors of technology 
are reckless as to the infringement they enable.  The existence of 
such recklessness can be determined with the BIFF balancing test 
suggested below.404 
In a digital copying case like Marvel v. NCsoft, a plaintiff first 
looks for direct infringement.  If there is no direct infringement, 
the plaintiff would seek liability under secondary liability theories.  
The second step is thus a look at the intent-based claim of 
contributory infringement.405  Grokster should be read to limit 
findings of contributory liability to cases where there is sufficient 
inducement.406  The Sony substantial noninfringing use standard 
should not be a factor in contributory liability analysis,407 nor 
should a plaintiff be obliged to prove knowledge of primary 
infringement, as the bad intent evidenced by inducement is 
sufficient culpability for a finding of liability. 
The third step would be a look to enabling technology liability.  
If the secondary liability claim is predicated on the use of enabling 
technology, such as file-sharing software or a MMORPG, the 
technology provider may find liability or safe harbor in the BIFF 
factors.  The factors should be balanced to determine whether there 
is a nascent technology deserving of protection, or a recklessness 
 
 401 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc,. 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 402 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775. 
 403 See id. at 2782 (noting that Grokster “addresses a different basis of liability” than 
Sony). 
 404 See infra Part VII.C. 
 405 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists 
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that “[o]ne infringes 
contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement”)). 
 406 See id. at 2780–81. 
 407 See id. at 2777–79. 
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toward the abuse of copyright that calls for liability.  This 
balancing test will incorporate the Sony standard in its factors that 
determine the respective values of the technology and the 
infringement. 
Finally, the plaintiff looks at vicarious liability claims for 
infringement that do not implicate the use of enabling technology, 
such as management of a flea market.408  Where there is (1) direct 
infringement by a primary party and (2) direct financial benefit to 
the defendant, as in Marvel v. NCsoft, vicarious liability is found if 
there is also (3) the right and ability to supervise the primary 
infringer on the part of the defendant.409 
The interplay here of direct infringement, contributory 
infringement, enabling technology liability and vicarious liability 
as the four degrees of copyright infringement is much easier to 
follow.  Once a liability theory has been established, courts could 
look to the DMCA safe harbor provisions.  If the defendant does 
not qualify for a safe harbor, the courts will have latitude under the 
DMCA to fashion an injunctive filtering solution, as articulated 
above. 
B. Presumption of Liability for Intellectual Property Transfer 
Enablers 
Where a company relies on the creation or consumption of 
intellectual property, there should be a rebuttable presumption that 
infringement is implicated and the company is obliged to take 
reasonable measures to curb infringement of its users.  The 
“monitor or control” language of the DMCA should be read more 
temporally broadly than it was in the Ninth Circuit opinion in 
Grokster.410  A modern reading of Sony in light of the DMCA 
seems to suggest that if there is sufficient non-infringing use, then 
there is no need to go into the DMCA analysis to see if there 
should be a safe harbor.411  This hurdle is too low for enablers.412  
 
 408 See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 409 See id. at 262. 
 410 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1165 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
 411 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 789 (1984); 
see also 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
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Enablers should be regulated by the DMCA, because it offers well-
considered guidelines and adequate flexibility for a solution.413  An 
appropriate standard is the balancing of a group of factors that 
realistically allow judges to craft appropriate solutions within the 
current legislative framework. 
C. BIFF Balancing Test 
When evaluating potential liability for the copyright 
infringement of third-party users, absent inducement, four factors 
should be used to evaluate whether a technology should be subject 
to liability under the provisions of the DCMA.  The factors are 
(1) to what extent it is a budding technology, (2) the degree of 
infringing use, (3) whether at conception and during early 
development there was foreseeable infringement, and (4) to what 
extent there is effective filtering of the infringement available or in 
use (BIFF Balancing Test). 
1. Budding Technology 
Where a technology is new, there is incentive to allow that 
technology to find its sea legs.  Fear of liability for third-party 
infringement might have discouraged Gutenberg.414  There should 
not be a free pass to allow significant infringement simply because 
a technology is new, but at the same time courts should not 
enthusiastically shut down innovation simply because it presently 
has practically unfilterable infringing use.415  Particular uses of 
 
 412 “It is uncontested that Defendants’ game has a substantial non-infringing use.” 
Ruling on NCsoft and Cryptic’s Motions to Strike and Dismiss, supra note 100, at *8–9. 
 413 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (2000).  In addition to other remedies, the statute provides 
that a court may grant “[s]uch other injunctive relief as the court may consider necessary 
to prevent or restrain infringement of copyrighted material specified in the order of the 
court at a particular online location, if such relief is the least burdensome to the service 
provider among the forms of relief comparably effective for that purpose.” Id. at 
§ 512(j)(iii). 
 414 JUSTICE BREYER: . . . for all I know, the monks had a fit when Gutenberg made 
his press. Transcript of Oral Argument at *9, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-480). 
 415 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, what I worry about is the suit that just comes right out 
of the box, as soon as the company starts up.  Will you give the company a couple of 
years to show that it’s developing a commercial use? 
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digital technology can mature quickly, much more so than, for 
example, the development of the photocopier, which took years.416  
Therefore, no standard time frame can be established to determine 
newness.  Courts should look to the business plan and marketing of 
the technology to measure whether the technology has reached a 
stated goal, and look to the stage of development of the technology 
itself rather than market penetration to make that measure.  Where 
a technology is promising, but has not yet reached a reasonable 
measure of its potential, this factor will weigh against a finding of 
liability for third-party infringement.417 
2. Infringing and Non-Infringing Use 
Substantiality of infringing use is a reasonable factor to bring 
into the equation.  Where there is a question of overzealous 
enforcement by a rights holder, an inquiry into the present and 
potential harm of the infringement is useful, through an 
examination of the noninfringing use of the technology as well as 
the non-infringing use of the copyrighted materials elsewhere.  If 
both are substantial, this factor will weigh against liability for 
third-party infringement and dissuade copyright owners from 
frivolous or harassing infringement liability claims and from 
unfairly exacting those claims. 
Justice Souter in Grokster described the infringing use as 
“prominently employed.”418  Justice Souter noted that “a few 
 
MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice Scalia, we have concerns about that, as well.  I don’t 
know that we would give them ten years of, sort of, free space to do as—facilitate as 
much copyright infringement as possible.  I think what we would say is that when 
you’re—when a suit targets a nascent technology at the very beginning, there ought to be 
a lot of leeway, not just for observed noninfringing uses, but for the capacity of 
noninfringing uses. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at *24–25, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480). 
 416 Difficulty in finding investors and developing the technology to a practical use took 
about twenty years. See About.com, Xerox Photocopiers, Xerography and Chester 
Carlson, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blxerox.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 
2006). 
 417 The story of how Sony, Samsung and others addressed potential infringement 
problems during the development of the DVD player is explored at Pioneer, DVD 
Technical Guide, http://www.pioneer.co.jp/crdl/tech/dvd/1-e.html (last visited Dec. 13, 
2005). 
 418 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2771. 
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searches” would show the infringing use of the software and that 
“no one can say how often the software is used to obtain copies of 
unprotected material,” but “the probable scope of copyright 
infringement is staggering.”419  The point, of course, would be “to 
attract users of a mind to infringe.”420 
3. Foreseeable Infringement 
It is foreseeable that a product called a Video Cassette 
Recorder will be used to infringe copyright.  A cell phone 
downloading unlicensed copies of a song to use as a ring tone is 
less so.  Where an enabler cannot reasonably foresee infringing 
use, it is less fair to impose an obligation for third-party 
infringement in the absence of a filter.  Once the infringement 
becomes known or foreseeable, there is an obligation to address 
the issue.  This is clear in the DMCA, Grokster, and Sony.  
Foreseeability can be measured by looking at evidence from the 
early stages of development of the technology as to its perceived 
potential use and the development of the infringing use of the 
technology.  The history of invention is rife with stories of 
unintended consequences,421 and enablers should not be held 
strictly responsible for them. 
In the absence of a finding of inducement, the marketing and 
business plans can still suggest behavior that should be 
discouraged.  The substantiality of reliance on infringers and their 
infringement will be a factor in a finding of liability.  A company’s 
courtship of users known to infringe should not be countenanced, 
nor should a knowing reliance on infringing users for income.  
Even where it falls short of inducement, a company’s knowing 
intent to exploit infringing behavior of its users should weigh in 
favor of a finding of liability. 
 
 419 Id. at 2772. 
 420 Id. at 2774. 
 421 “Richard James was a [World War II-era] naval engineer trying to develop a meter 
designed to monitor horsepower on naval battleships.  [He] was working with tension 
springs when one of the springs fell to the ground.  He saw how the spring kept moving 
after it hit the ground and an idea for a toy was born. See About.com, The History of the 
SLINKY: Richard James and Betty James Invented the Slinky in 1945, 
http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blslinky.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). 
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4. Filtering 
The key element is ease of filtering technologies.422  If 
companies know at start-up that part of their responsibility will be 
to take reasonable technological measures to deter infringement, in 
addition to warnings, then there will be the requisite certainty 
needed for efficient commerce. Filtering technologies will require 
cooperation between the enablers and the rights holders.  It is no 
excuse that the users are infringing without any affirmative 
participation of the enablers.423  Car companies manufacture seat 
belts even though they are not participating in crashes.  
Technology companies should expect to employ filtering 
technologies as a cost of doing business. 
Where an enabler has implemented a reasonable technological 
standard that is likely to (1) fully address potential infringement of 
its users, and (2) not discourage participation of rights holders in 
the implementation of protective measures, this factor will weigh 
heavily for a finding that the enabler deserves safe harbor under 
the DMCA, and should not be found a contributory or vicarious 
infringer. 
D. NCsoft and Cryptic Fail the BIFF Test 
City of Heroes is not a budding technology.  There are many 
videogames and games of this kind have been around for many 
years.  The creators set out to build a working video game, and 
now they have one.  The Creation Engine is mature enough to 
enable 1027 possible combinations of character appearance.424  The 
game itself is realized enough that it has spawned a sequel.425  City 
of Heroes does not require extra protection as a new technology. 
 
 422 There is no evidence that either company made an effort to filter copyrighted 
material. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 423 The ability of a service provider to prevent its customers from infringing is a factor 
to be considered in determining whether the provider is a contributory infringer. See In re 
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 424 See Ruling on Marvel’s Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, supra note 81, at 1. 
 425 NCsoft and Cryptic released the superhero MMORPG City of Villains on October 1, 
2005.  It allows players to create villains, and battle other players (PVP), two functions 
unavailable in City of Heroes. See, e.g., Press Release, PlayNC, NCsoft Launches City of 
Villains, (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://www.plaync.com/about/2005/10/ncsoft_ 
launches_4.html. 
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There is a prominent degree of infringing use, one of the 
measures used in Grokster.426  Although the exact percentages are 
not known,427 it is clear that City of Heroes users regularly 
encounter infringing characters.428  As Marvel is not only a fellow 
trafficker in superheroes, but also uses them in video games, the 
presence of their characters in a competing product is infringement 
with compelling consequences.  But this factor has strong 
arguments on both sides.  NCsoft and Cryptic Studios point out 
that infringers are shut down when they are discovered, and usage 
shows that a majority of characters in the game are entirely 
original.  Of the minority that infringe, an even smaller percentage 
infringes Marvel’s rights.  It is unclear which direction this factor 
tilts here—not nearly as clear as it would have been in Grokster, 
where the overwhelming use was infringing. 
It is abundantly clear that the infringement found in City of 
Heroes was foreseeable from the very inception of the game.429  
NCsoft and Cryptic had created a heralded Creation Engine and 
marketed the game to comic book readers who were used to 
playing licensed characters in superhero video games.  This factor 
strongly supports a finding of liability. 
It is clear that City of Heroes has the ability to filter its 
Creation Engine and Tailor functions to prevent third-party 
infringements, with the cooperation of rights holders, and did not 
avail itself fully of that option.  The flexibility and control Cryptic 
Studios has exercised over the continuing development of the 
game indicates that implementing the features suggested in this 
Note would be considerably less burdensome than defending the 
lawsuit has been.  This factor weighs decisively in favor of finding 
liability for NCsoft. 
 
 426 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2771. 
 427 Presuming digital recordkeeping by NCsoft, with discovery, the Roy G. Biv 7% 
standard and the String Solution, it may be possible to reconstruct a precise record of 
infringement. 
 428 See, e.g., Sauisag, supra note  and accompanying text. 
 429 Richard Dakan, a childhood friend of Michael Lewis, majority-owner of Cryptic 
Studios, “brought in his grad school buddy, a classics scholar named Jack Emmert, to 
build a game featuring the science fiction of comic-book superheroes-without paying 
license fees for established characters like Batman or Spider-Man. Hardy, supra note 2. 
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Had this case gone to trial, NCsoft and Cryptic should not have 
been able to avail themselves of the safe harbor provisions of the 
DMCA under Section 512 (a) or Section 512 (c), the categories 
under which City of Heroes falls.430  The infringing activity is 
apparent, thus denying safe harbor under (c).  As a result, the court 
should have been able to exercise the injunctive power granted 
under Section 512(j)(1)(A)(iii) and implement the Roy G. Biv 7% 
Solution and the String Solution presented above.  Instead, the 
parties came to mutual and undisclosed agreement, and the 
question of how to properly follow the law absent inducement 
remains unanswered. 
CONCLUSION 
The BIFF factors should replace the Sony test as a form of 
secondary liability called enabling technology liability, separate 
from contributory infringement and vicarious liability.  This 
structure provides an incentive for filtering, which addresses the 
problem at its most solvable point.  In the absence of filtering, the 
factors also provide ready access to the guidance of the self-
regulating aspects of the DMCA that are stymied by the elusive 
and overly inclusive Sony safe harbor, which protects enablers 
from user infringement liability where there is substantial non-
infringing use.  Courts should fully and case-specifically avail 
themselves of the injunctive powers granted them in the DMCA 
when parties cannot resolve issues on their own, as incentive for 
parties to come to agreements without turning to the legal system.  
When a disagreement results in the need for injunctive relief in an 
instance of character infringement by an enabling technology, the 
Roy G. Biv 7% Solution and the String Solution should be 
adopted.  Marvel v. NCsoft ended in settlement, which is preferable 
to a full trial, but left these issues unresolved.  When a similar case 
arises implicating secondary liability and enabling technology, 
courts should articulate a solution that goes beyond Sony and 
provides both content and technology companies with sensible 
 
 430 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c) (2000). 
PAYNE 5/18/2006  11:36 AM 
1016 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:939 
guidelines for protecting their intellectual property and limiting 
their exposure to liability. 
 
